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Abstract 
This report maps current enforcement and compliance measures and practices in Ontario’s 
regulation of employment, particularly as they relate to precarious employment. It evaluates the 
effectiveness of Ontario’s enforcement regimes, focusing on Employment Standards (ES) and 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) legislation, and sets these regimes in the context of those 
operating in jurisdictions across and outside Canada. Through this process, it identifies and 
evaluates potential reforms to improve regulatory effectiveness, particularly for workers in 
precarious jobs. The central argument is that there are fundamental deficiencies in both of these 
enforcement regimes: each, albeit in different ways, is out of step with the realities of the 
contemporary labour market and each demands more proactive approaches to regulation 
combined with, where appropriate, innovative reactive and voluntary measures that are 
embedded in strong public enforcement.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report maps current enforcement and compliance measures and practices in 
Ontario’s regulation of employment, particularly as they relate to precarious 
employment. It evaluates the effectiveness of Ontario’s enforcement regimes, focusing 
on Employment Standards (ES) and Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) legislation, 
and sets these regimes in the context of those operating in jurisdictions across and 
outside Canada. Through this process, it identifies and evaluates potential reforms to 
improve regulatory effectiveness, particularly for workers in precarious jobs. The central 
argument is that there are fundamental deficiencies in both of these enforcement 
regimes: each, albeit in different ways, is out of step with the realities of the 
contemporary labour market and each demands more proactive approaches to 
regulation combined with, where appropriate, innovative reactive and voluntary 
measures that are embedded in strong public enforcement.  
 While the report focuses on enforcement practices related to ES and OHS 
legislation, it is instructive to begin with a brief discussion of both the broader principles 
that underpin these pieces of legislation and the general models of enforcement that 
aim to implement these principles. 
 At a normative level, both ES and OHS legislation aim to promote ‘decent work.’ 
The concept of ‘decent work’ as developed through the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) is defined as jobs that provide income and employment security, 
equity, and human dignity.2 This aim is articulated in regulations at multiple scales and 
at the international level it is the rationale for ILO standards.3 Specifically, the norm of 
decent work is rooted in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
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Rights At Work and more recent 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for Fair 
Globalization. The 1998 Declaration defines these fundamental rights to be: freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child 
labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.4 
In 2008, the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization built on this 
framework committing members to implementing the Decent Work Agenda through four 
interconnected objectives: (i) promoting decent work by creating a sustainable 
institutional and economic environment; (ii) developing and enhancing measures of 
social protection – social security and labour protection – which are sustainable and 
adopted to national circumstances; (iii) promoting social dialogue and tripartism; and (iv) 
respecting, promoting and realizing the fundamental principles and rights at work.5 The 
norm of decent work shapes regional labour standards agreements as well. For 
example, in North America this norm informs the labour standards side agreement to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the North American Agreement on 
Labour Cooperation, including its principles on ES, non-discrimination, prevention of, 
and compensation for, occupational injuries, and protection of migrant workers.6 
 In Canada broadly and in Ontario in particular, the pursuit of decent work entails 
three normative goals: the promotion of social minima, universality, and fairness. 
Social minima refers to “ensuring that workers benefit from minimum acceptable 
conditions of employment and … actively promot[ing] the adoption of socially desirable 
terms and conditions of employment.”7 This is historically a primary rationale for ES 
legislation, which is meant to establish a legislative floor below which conditions of 
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employment are not to fall. Such a floor is recognized as necessary to protect against 
employer exploitation due to unequal bargaining power between workers and employers 
(see goal of fairness below). 
The second goal is universality. This objective involves “extend[ing] the 
minimum benefits of the legislation to the greatest possible number of employees.”8 
While universality is a stated goal of legislated standards, special exemptions and/or 
conditions are often built into legislation to exclude particular employee groups from 
coverage of some or all standards depending on the circumstances of their 
employment.   
 Finally, the goal of fairness refers to “safeguard[ing] workers against exploitation 
and …protect[ing] employers against unfair competition based on lower standards.”9 
Underlying the principle of fairness lies the imperative to address the fundamental 
power imbalance that exists between employers and employees, particularly those 
workers who are without union representation and in the most precarious forms of 
employment. 
 These normative goals contribute to, and are reinforced by, the workplace policy 
objectives of assuring basic labour standards, protecting against major down side risks 
associated with employment and mitigating against power imbalances and resulting 
abuses.10 Such workplace objectives translate into, and are shaped by, both OHS laws 
(protections against exposure to unacceptably hazardous working conditions and 
provisions for worker involvement in OHS management) and ES laws (standards 
governing payment of wages, hours of work and eating periods, overtime pay, minimum 
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wage, public holidays, vacation with pay, equal pay for equal work, benefit plans, leaves 
of absence, and termination and severance of employment).  
Such laws are then enforced through a range of regulatory strategies that differ in 
the way they deploy available enforcement tools. In broad terms, there are three 
general forms of enforcement: (i) proactive enforcement; (ii) reactive enforcement; 
and (iii) voluntary compliance.  
 Proactive enforcement relies heavily on inspections and expanded 
investigations when violations are detected. Orders to pay and prosecutions are used to 
achieve both specific and general deterrence. In this form of enforcement, inspections 
are carried out in order to determine whether or not violations are taking place, rather 
than as a response to a specific complaint.11 Proactive inspections may be used in 
forms of ‘strategic enforcement’, where employers in sectors known to have high levels 
of violations are targeted for inspection.12 The underlying assumption of this strategy is 
that the proactive approach will not only detect un/underreported violations, but also that 
the fear of possible inspection will create pressure for employers in these sectors to 
improve compliance.  Moreover, the proactive approach is favoured by many labour 
organizations and advocates as workers in high violation sectors are often the most 
vulnerable to employer power and the least likely to complain.13  
Proactive enforcement can take other forms as well. For example, among others, 
Weil14 discusses the use of a strategy known as the ‘hot cargo’ boycott, which utilizes a 
provision of the Fair Labor and Standards Act in the US to enable state boycotts or the 
embargoing of goods that are manufactured in violation of the Act. This tactic caused 
garment manufacturers to pressure subcontractors to improve compliance with 
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legislated standards. Additional forms of proactive enforcement may come from 
collaborative efforts between government agencies or even forms of tri-partite 
collaboration, integrating unions and civil society organizations into the enforcement 
process alongside government and employers.15 
 Reactive enforcement depends on complaints to trigger regulatory intervention, 
and typically emphasizes negotiated settlements, reserving more coercive measures 
such as orders to pay and prosecution for egregious cases. The most common form of 
reactive enforcement is complaints from individual workers who have experienced 
violations of legislated standards.16 Typically, these complaints will initiate an 
investigation by the relevant government agency, which may lead to prosecution and 
penalties for employers and settlements for workers17 As workers in precarious jobs are 
often reluctant to raise complaints about violations due to fear of job loss, systems of 
anonymous complaints are considered to be more conducive to protecting workers’ 
rights in such situations.18  As a means to increase pressure on employers to comply 
with legislated standards, Kent Elson19 argues for private prosecution of employers who 
violate employment standards, suggesting that this would not only punish violators but 
could also foster new norms of compliance through both stiff penalties and social 
stigma.  
As with proactive enforcement, forms of collaboration between public and private 
actors have been identified as offering possibilities for reactive enforcement. 
Collaborative strategies may include public regulation of private (voluntary) codes of 
conduct,20 and union-government partnerships in conducting labour standards 
inspections.21 As with collaborative proactive strategies, the aim in these approaches is 
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to bring state agencies and private actors together in the enforcement process to 
improve compliance. Using the Australian case as an example, however, Hardy and 
Howe22 caution that as unions are integrated into this process, they may be drawn 
towards reactive strategies and lose their capacity to engage in preventative (proactive) 
forms of enforcement. 
Finally, voluntary compliance is an enforcement strategy that depends heavily 
on education for both workers and employers about legislated standards, as well as 
employer strategies of ‘self-regulation’ through private codes of conduct. Voluntary 
compliance strategies may also lead to negotiated settlements when complaints arise. 
Prosecutions may be used, but generally as a last resort. With practices and principles 
of corporate social responsibility becoming commonplace in recent years, employer 
self-regulation often takes the form of voluntary codes of conduct that companies 
develop themselves to regulate working conditions, including working conditions across 
transnational supply chains.23 As they are voluntary, there is great variation across 
these types of codes, though they may build from principles of international labour 
standards developed through the ILO. While they are developed and implemented 
privately, they may involve forms of ‘monitored self-regulation’, for example through 
third-party auditing of the application of the standards contained within the codes.24 
Advocates of self-regulation/voluntary compliance through corporate codes of conduct 
suggest that such codes hold potential to improve compliance with legislation as 
companies will be more inclined to comply with practices they develop themselves. 
Critics, however, warn that self-regulation without backing by ‘hard law’ does not offer 
an effective mechanism of monitoring or enforcement.25 
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Governments may play a role in promoting voluntary compliance strategies as 
well. Specifically, government strategies to foster voluntary compliance include 
producing and disseminating information materials to raise awareness about legislated 
standards,26 engaging in ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns to publicize information 
about egregious violations,27 and developing public procurement policy agreements that 
award government contracts to companies that have strong compliance practices.28 The 
assumption underlying these practices is that the role of government should be to foster 
employer ‘self-reliance’ in complying with legislation, rather than taking a proactive 
approach to enforcement or relying on prosecutions and fines. 
 Each of these models of enforcement is outlined in specific detail in the report’s 
sections on the ESA (S.II), the OHSA (S.III), and in its discussion of ‘best practices’ (S. 
V). 
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II. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
A. Ontario Legislation --  The Employment Standards Act 
ES are legislated standards that set minimum terms and conditions of employment in 
areas such as wages, working time, vacations and leaves, termination and severance. 
ES generally apply to most workers in a labour market but are often the only source of 
workplace protection for workers in non-unionized jobs. The majority of Ontario’s over 6 
million workers in over 370,000 workplaces rely on ES. This section of the paper 
provides both a chronological overview of the development of ES legislation in Ontario, 
and a summary of recent reforms to Ontario’s Employment Standards Act (ESA).  
1.1969-1995 
Ontario’s ESA was enacted in 1969. The ESA provided a minimum wage for both men 
and women and established maximum hours of work at 8 per day and 48 per week. An 
overtime rate of time and a half was set for anything over 48 hours a week and the Act 
established the right to refuse overtime work. It also provided for time and a half on 7 
statutory holidays and guaranteed 2 weeks of paid vacation per year. The principles 
behind the development of the Act were consistent with normative framework outlined 
above. Specifically, the legislation was designed to set minimum standards for Ontario’s 
labour market and provide legislative protection for those most vulnerable to employer 
exploitation.29  
The core standards of the ESA were altered through minor reforms in the 1970s, 
1980s, and early 1990s, most of which added to the scope of legislative protections for 
workers in the province. Termination notice requirements were added in 1971.  In 1972, 
a pregnancy leave provision was added that gave employees with at least 1 year of 
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seniority in workplaces of 25 or more up to 12 weeks (6 and 6) of pre- and post-natal 
leave, and entitlement to their former or a comparable position.  In 1975, the overtime 
pay (time-and-one-half) threshold was reduced from 48 hours to 44, and pregnancy 
leave provisions were expanded to cover up to 17 weeks of leave.  In 1976, the 
province introduced a differential (lower) minimum wage rate for servers in the 
hospitality industry.   
Severance pay provisions were introduced in 1981.30 These provisions provided 
employees with a minimum of 5 years of service with 1 week’s pay for each year 
worked up to a maximum of 26 weeks in cases of mass termination. Under 
amendments made in 1987, employers were required to provide termination notices 1 
week in advance for any employee employed longer than 3 months, with an additional 
week’s notice for each year of employment, up to a maximum of 8 weeks.31 Workers 
with 5 years of employment at a business with an annual payroll of at least $2.5 million 
became eligible for severance pay.  In addition, the new severance provisions were 
extended to workers whose temporary lay-off extended beyond 35 weeks in a 52-week 
period. Further, in the case of mass layoffs, the legislation required that employers 
provide the Ministry of Labour (MOL) with an explanation of the economic 
circumstances surrounding the termination, a summary of consultations with employees 
and the affected community, any proposed measures to help those laid off, and a 
statistical profile of affected workers. 
Bankruptcy protection legislation was introduced in the Spring of 1991.32 The 
Employee Wage Protection Program was designed to provide employees with 
compensation for unpaid wages, commissions, overtime wages, vacation pay, holiday 
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pay, and termination and severance pay, up to a maximum of $5000 per employee.  
The program was administered through the Employment Standards Branch of the MOL 
and Employment Standards Officers (ESOs) were given the ability to order payments 
under the program.  The program was funded out of general provincial revenues.  Upon 
payment of a claim, the government would attempt to recover funds from employers and 
businesses.   
2. 1995-2001 
Beginning in 1995, Ontario’s ES underwent a three-stage reform process. The reforms 
pursued constituted a break from the normative framework of ES outlined above. 
Specifically, they were designed primarily to promote ‘flexibility’ for employers, in 
particular through changes to working time standards introduced in 2001.  
First, in 1995 the Employee Wage Protection Program was terminated and the 
minimum wage was frozen at $6.85, a wage freeze that would last for 9 years. Second, 
in 1996, the Employment Standards Improvement Act reduced the time limit for workers 
to register formal complaints from 2 years to 6 months, and placed a $10,000 limit on 
monetary awards for ESA violations, regardless of the value of lost wages. The Act also 
introduced a provision preventing unionized employees from filing ES complaints with 
the MOL, requiring employees with union representation to resolve ES complaints 
through the grievance arbitration process, placing the cost of administering ESA 
complaints in the hands of unions, rather than the Ministry.33  
Finally, major legislative changes were implemented in the ESA, 2000. These 
amendments increased weekly maximum hours of work from 48 to 60 and allowed for 
the calculation of overtime pay to be based on an averaging of overtime hours across a 
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4-week period: employers could schedule overtime hours without compensation at time 
and a half provided the total for the 4-week period was less than 176 hours. They also 
revoked the system of government permits required for excess hours (more than 48 per 
week), introducing instead a requirement for employee ”consent” to the new excess 
hours and overtime averaging provisions. The ESA 2000 also introduced anti-reprisal 
protections and family crisis leave. In addition, the government expanded the parental 
leave provisions of the Act, to bring them in line with federal amendments to the 
Employment Insurance program, allowing for up to 52 weeks of unpaid, job protected 
leave for birth mothers and up to 37 weeks for new parents (generally fathers or 
adoptive parents). 
3.  2004-10 
Between 2004 and 2010, ES reforms displayed a partial return to decent work 
principles, with the introduction of ES legislation targeted at particular groups of 
‘vulnerable workers’: specifically, workers employed through temporary help agencies 
and live-in caregivers.34  In developing this legislation, the government assumed that 
most employers will comply with minimum standards legislation and aimed to target 
legislative reforms at employers in sectors where violations are high. 
The Employment Standards Amendment Act (Temporary Help Agencies) 2009 
developed new standards for workers in temporary help agencies. It introduced 
requirements that temporary agencies must provide information about the agency 
(name and contact information) and working conditions (incl. pay, hours, nature of work) 
to workers. It extended ESA coverage for public holiday pay and termination and 
severance to these workers. Finally, it introduced some prohibitions on charging fees to 
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clients for entering into employment agreements with assignment employees. 
Specifically, agencies are permitted to charge clients a fee if an employee is offered a 
permanent position in first six months of an assignment with that client.  
In 2010, the Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers 
and Others), introduced a series of legislative protections for those employed as live-in 
caregivers. Specifically, it banned fees charged by recruiters and employers, allowed 
live-in-caregivers up to 3! years to make a complaint to recover prohibited fees, 
prohibited reprisals against live-in caregivers for exercising their rights under the 
legislation, and prohibited an employer or recruiter from taking possession of a live-in 
caregiver’s property (incl. documents such as passports). The Act also authorized ESOs 
to proactively enforce the legislation. 
4. 2010 to present 
Finally, the most recent reforms to the ESA were introduced through the Open for 
Business Act, 2010 (OBA). This Act focused on enforcement, modifying enforcement 
practices with the stated aim of making these practices more ‘efficient’. Specifically, the 
OBA alters ES enforcement procedures fundamentally by, among other things, requiring 
workers facing ES violations to first approach their employers for a resolution, 
mandating that workers and employers provide information on their claims before they 
will be accepted by the MOL, and giving new powers to ESOs to facilitate settlements 
between workers and employers, including unprecedented discretion over monetary 
compensation for workers.35  Like the ESA reforms of 2001, the OBA was a clear 
departure from the norms of decent work outlined above, prioritizing the efficient 
resolution of claims over the aim of protecting vulnerable workers. 
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First, employees are required to notify their employer before the MOL will initiate 
an ES claim.36 The assumption behind this requirement is that “[m]ost employers want 
to do the right thing and they will often remedy the situation promptly and voluntarily, if 
they agree there is a valid claim.”37 Second, the amendments place responsibility on 
individual workers to collect the information for their complaints, reducing the 
requirements on the investigative procedure itself. If an ESO determines that there is 
insufficient evidence provided by an employee, then the officer may determine there is 
no violation. Finally, the amendments promote a voluntary approach to ES regulation, 
specifically through amendments that give ESOs a role in bringing employers and 
employees to a mediated settlement, with the Act stating that “[n]either party would 
have to participate in such a settlement unless they agree to it.”38 
In addition to the OBA, the MOL struck an Employment Standards Task Force to 
address the backlog of 14,000 ES complaints that have accumulated in recent years. 
The Task Force has a two-year mandate to clear this backlog and will operate under the 
aegis of the reformed ESA. The Task Force will not engage in a process of proactive 
investigation into ESA violations, but will investigate these existing claims “based on an 
officer's review of written materials and through telephone discussions with parties.”39 
The Task Force will also utilize the new emphasis on voluntary, mediated settlements 
as a means to resolve claims and to create efficiencies in the enforcement process.  
 
B. Mapping Employment Standards Enforcement 
Workers’ access to minimum ES depends on the government’s ability to promote and 
enforce such standards. The legislation provides the Director of Employment Standards 
and ESOs with broad powers of investigation (e.g., entering business premises and 
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requiring production of records for inspection). Officers have extensive authority to 
resolve complaints of violations including settlements, orders to pay, fines, compliance 
orders and prosecutions. There is no statutory provision specifying how investigations 
and enforcement are to be done. In practice, it is the policies and procedures 
established by the Branch that determine the choices Officers can make in investigation 
and enforcement techniques.  
The MOL has three main strategies of ES enforcement: self-regulation and 
compliance by employers; self-enforcement by employees when employers are non-
compliant; and proactive enforcement and education to improve employer compliance, 
largely by targeting employers most likely to be in violation of the ESA. It does this by:  
• Providing information to employers and employees, encouraging employers to 
comply voluntarily;  
• Investigating and resolving employees’ complaints of employer violations;  
• Conducting inspections of employers that are likely to be in violation; and, 
• Deterring violations through appropriate penalties.40 
With almost 6 million employees in over 370,000 workplaces the MOL relies on 
employers to voluntarily comply with the ESA. When employers do not comply, 
individual workers are responsible for seeking their unpaid wages or ES entitlements 
from their employer and, through this process, may file a complaint for ES violations at 
the MOL. The MOL also undertakes proactive enforcement of employers that are at risk 
of ES violations. The reality is, however, that the majority of resources on ES 
enforcement go to investigating individual complaints of employer violations – that is, to 
reactive enforcement measures. The ensuing discussion examines these compliance 
! $( 
and enforcement activities.  
1. Employer Self-Regulation / Voluntary Compliance 
The self-regulation strategy hinges on employers acting as good corporate citizens. The 
MOL seeks to assist employers’ compliance by providing the following types of 
information:41 
Phone: The Employment Standards Information Centre, administered by Service 
Ontario, provides information about ES. It assisted almost 350,000 in 2009-2010. Legal 
advice is not provided. The toll-free call centre provides interpreters for its multi-lingual 
phone service.  
Email: The MOL responds to emails from employers and employees – it prepared 9,000 
such responses in 2010.  
Website: The MOL has a variety of information tools explaining provisions of the ESA, 
how they may apply, and how to file an ESA claim. Videos showing employers what to 
expect in an inspection are provided as are videos on what workers can expect once 
they file a claim. The Ministry also communicates by social media (e.g., facebook and 
twitter). General information has been translated into 23 languages.42                               
2. Self-enforcement  
When employers do not comply with ES, it is up to the individual worker to seek remedy 
from their employer and, failing that, by filing a claim with the MOL for unpaid wages 
and other ES entitlements. Historically, the MOL has encouraged employees to try and 
recover unpaid wages and ES prior to filing a claim. For example, when the MOL 
introduced on-line claims process in 2006-07, it posted a Self-Help kit for employees. 
This kit was intended to assist workers in learning about their ESA entitlements, 
determining which ES had been violated, and calculating the amount of unpaid wages 
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owing. Employees were then asked to contact their employer to obtain wages owing. 
With the passage of the OBA in 2010, workers are now required (with some 
exceptions)43 to first contact their employer to seek their ES entitlements. If a worker is 
unsuccessful in enforcing their ES entitlements, s/he is then allowed to file a complaint 
at the MOL for investigation.  
 (i) Individual Claims Investigation 
In general, after a claim was filed by a worker, an ESO investigated the claim to 
determine whether or not, and if so which, ES violations had occurred. The ESO 
evaluated evidence provided by the employer and the employee and made a 
determination on the claim. The institutional practice during investigations was to seek 
information from both the claimant and employer through telephone calls, letters and 
fact-finding meetings in which both parties were given the opportunity to present their 
case. To varying degrees, ESOs could gather evidence in ways that accounted for 
some of the barriers faced by people in low-wage and precarious employment (e.g., not 
understanding ES and claims process, language and literacy barriers). However, factors 
such as increasing numbers of claims, on-line filing of claims with information missing, 
and difficulties encountered in reaching the parties during ESO working hours 
contributed to a growing back-log in complaints and pressure to change the 
investigation process.  The OBA introduced a new requirement that certain information 
be provided in writing on the claim form before a worker’s claim would be allowed to 
proceed. Further, the OBA introduced a section (s. 102.1) that allows ESOs to deal with 
undue delays by making a decision on the best information available. The OBA places a 
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greater burden on workers to provide evidence of employer violations, rather than a 
reverse onus on employers to refute allegations.  
During the 1970’s the MOL used individual claims as “levers to pry open and 
expose to scrutiny” a company’s entire range of operations. ESOs were required to 
conduct full audits to disclose all violations for current employees. The number of 
employees receiving payments because of investigations and inspections in 1971 was 
52,263. Full audits were generally done as a follow-up to every individual complaint. But 
rising caseload of complaints in the early 1970s saw the branch shift to ‘complainant 
only’ and away from expanded investigations protecting all workers.44 The number of 
expanded investigations has declined since the 1970s. As noted by Ontario’s Auditor 
General in 2004, while violations were found to exist in about 70 percent of complaints 
filed, few investigations were expanded to protect the employer’s current employees 
who may also be facing violations.45  In 2009-10, the Ministry conducted 99 expanded 
investigations where a workplace was identified for an inspection based on the results 
found during an individual claim investigation. In that same year, 20,762 claims were 
investigated and violations assessed totalled almost $64.4 million ($42.9 million of 
which was subject to bankruptcy or insolvency).46 There is no follow-up to inform current 
employees of what their entitlements may be under the ESA to create incentives for 
future employer compliance.  
(ii) Individual Claims Resolution 
Over 80 percent of claims are resolved during the investigation process. Claims are 
either withdrawn by the claimant, a settlement is reached between the employer and 
employee, the employer complies with an ESO determination of wages owing, or a 
! $+ 
claim is denied. In less than 20 percent of cases, the ESO issues an Order to Pay to the 
employer or Director. Claimants and employers have the right to appeal an ESO order 
to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB). But few do. Less than 5 percent of such 
claims proceed to appeal at the OLRB.  
Institutional practices for arriving at settlements have allowed claimants and 
employers to enter into settlements during the claims process.  Indeed, the complaint is 
deemed to have been ‘settled’ as long as the ESO receives the terms of settlement in 
writing. In such cases, any orders respecting the employers’ contraventions are void 47. 
Historically, ESOs were not supposed to “negotiate, promote, or ‘broker’ settlement 
agreements.”48 However, over time, growing pressures were placed on workers to settle 
during the claims process.49  There are no data available on the number of claims 
settled below statutory minimums.  
In response to a substantial backlog in claims in 2009-10, the OBA introduced 
new powers for ESOs to “attempt to effect a settlement.” Employers and employees are 
given the option of discussing settlement, with the ESO playing a mediating role.  
Should a settlement not be reached, the ESO resumes the investigation and decision-
making. An initial pilot project of facilitated settlements found that 21 percent of cases 
that went to a decision-making meeting were resolved through settlements and that 
these cases resulted in settlements of, on average, 17 percent lower than was 
assessed to be owed by the ESO.50 
When an employer voluntarily complies with an ESO decision that an ES 
entitlement must be paid to a claimant, the employer either pays what they should have 
in the first place, or less if a lower settlement is accepted. There are no penalties or 
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other costs to the employer. Further, when an ES complaint is settled without an order 
to pay being issued, there can be no fines levied through contravention notices.  
(iii)  Penalties 
The ESA sets out a variety of sanctions that can be used against employers that are 
found in violation of the Act. However, the MOL does not provide guidelines or criteria 
for the use of the sanctions and penalties listed below: 
Order to Pay Wages (s. 103) is issued when an ESO finds that wages are owing and 
the employer has not volunteered to pay the wages. This order is subject to a 
$10,000 cap on unpaid wages (s. 103(2)) and will include an additional 
administrative fee of 10 percent of wages owing. 
Directors’ Order to Pay Wages (s. 106 and 2. 107) is issued to a director of a 
corporation where the employer has not paid the wages required under an 
Order to Pay.  
Order for Compensation (s. 104, 74.16, 74.17) deals with those matters under the Act in 
which damages are awarded when an ESO determines that an employee 
has suffered a loss. These orders relate to the reprisals, leaves of absence, 
retail business establishments and lie detector provisions of the Act.  
Order to Reinstate (s. 104 and 74.17) may be issued in the matters outlined under 
compensation orders.  
Compliance Order (s. 108) may be issued when an officer finds that an employer 
contravened any part of the Act or regulations. Compliance orders may be 
issued if there has been voluntary compliance to ensure that there is a record 
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of the employer’s violation and enforcement activity. Such orders require 
employers to cease violating ES provisions specified by a certain time.  
Notice of Contravention (s. 113) are monetary penalties for violations set out in 
regulation (O. Reg. 289/01) and generally increase from $250 to $1,000 per 
contravention per person violated. 
Prosecution (s. 132) of employers that contravene the Act or its regulations may take 
place and if so, on conviction, individual employers may be liable to fines up 
to a maximum of $50,000 or imprisonment of not more than 12 months, or 
both, and corporations are liable for fines up to a maximum of  $100,000 and 
increased fines for subsequent convictions. .  
ESOs have the discretion to use or not use the above orders and Part 1 Tickets in 
inspections and investigations. As Graph 1 demonstrates, the MOL’s preferred sanction 
is to issue Compliance Orders.  In 2009-2010, 20,762 claims were investigated finding 
that employers owed $64.4 million to workers yet only 86 fines (notice of contravention) 
and 298 tickets ($360) were issued. Prosecutions are determined by the Employment 
Standards Branch and Legal Services Branch of the MOL the latter of which conducts 
the prosecutions.  Prosecutions are for non-compliance with Orders issued from the 
MOL and do not directly remedy unpaid wages for workers. The Ministry initiated 13 
prosecutions of employers in violation in 2009-2010.51  
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Graph 1. ES Penalties 
 
 
Source: Ontario MOL Fiscal Year Reports, 2005-07 and Employment Standards Program Annual 
Reports, 2007-10 (on file with authors) 
 
(iv) Collections 
A key component of ES enforcement is recovering wages and other monies that have 
been found owing to workers. As Table 1 demonstrates, a substantial amount of the 
monies owed to workers are from employers who are insolvent or bankrupt. Recovery of 
unpaid wages in cases of bankruptcy or insolvency is difficult because workers become 
one of several creditors’ owed money and are paid subject to priority ranking as 
determined by federal bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. The MOL assists 
employees by filing Proofs of Claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy or the Monitor. The 
recession of 2008-9 saw a dramatic rise in bankruptcies. 
Table 1 illustrates that an average of 50 to 54 percent of wages assessed to be 
owed during investigation (excluding bankruptcies) were recovered between 2006 and 
2010 through the MOL claims process. A further 6 to 9 percent are recovered by 
workers during the Labour Board appeal process. Collection agencies recovered 
between 12 to 16 percent of wages owing in cases sent to collections. 52 
By far, the most successful recovery of wages owing is through proactive 
inspections. Between 92 to 99 percent of wages assessed during inspections from 
2006/07 to 2009/10 were recovered for workers.  
Table 1 Wages Assessed and Wages Recovered  
 Fiscal  Fiscal  Fiscal Fiscal 
Penalties 
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2006-07 
($000’s) 
2007-08 
($000’s) 
2008-09 
($000’s) 
2009-10 
($000’s) 
Wages owing assed from claims 
investigation 
$23,335 $16,560 $15,118 $19,737 
Wages owing assessed from 
inspections 
$1,905 $1,289 $2,115 $1,759 
Wages owing assessed from 
bankruptcies and insolvencies 
$23,424 $12,309 $48,753 $42,900 
Total wages owing 
 
$48,664 $30,158 $65,986 $62,637 
     
Wages recovered from employers 
during claims investigation process  
$12,639 $8,201 $7,736 $10,323 
Wages recovered from employers 
during proactive inspections 
$1,748 $1,282 $1,928 $1,737 
Wages paid from employer appeals ($ 
held in trust)53 
$2,017 $1,425 $952 $1,642 
Wages recovered from private 
collection agency on contract with MOL 
$1,000 $889 $1,031 $1,125 
Total wages recovered 
 
$17,404 $11,777 $11,647 $14,827 
Source: MOL, Employment Standards Program Annual Reports 2007-2008 to 2009-2010 
 
 
3. Proactive Inspections 
 
According to the MOL, proactive inspections aim to: ensure compliance with standards; 
communicate the requirements of the ESA; raise awareness and understanding by 
employees and employers of their rights and responsibilities; and promote self-reliance 
in the workplace.54 Consistent with a largely reactive approach, the MOL does not use 
inspections to address individual employee’s complaints of ES violations. 
The MOL currently focuses efforts and resources largely on investigating claims 
of ES violations from individuals against former employers. However, this has not 
always been the focus. Prior to changes to the Act in the late 1960’s, the bulk of the 
Branch’s enforcement activity in hours of work and minimum wage protections involved 
conducting surprise spot checks or planned visits to investigate companies’ compliance 
with the law. With new powers to collect wages beyond the minimum standards in 1969, 
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a shift from proactive enforcement through inspections to individual complaints began to 
take place.55  
Much of the focus during the 1980’s and 1990s was to avoid large backlogs of 
unresolved claims. As Graph 2 illustrates, ES inspections of workplaces were almost 
non-existent during that same period.   
Graph 2. Proactive Inspections 
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In April 2004, then Minister of Labour Chris Bentley announced that the 
government was ‘putting enforcement back on the agenda.’56 Alongside legislative 
changes to the hours of work provisions, the government claimed it would focus on 
improving education and awareness around both workers’ rights and employers’ 
obligations, shorten the time to process claims, dedicate resources to conduct 2,000 
proactive inspections, improve collections, and increase the number of prosecutions.  
In 2004, the MOL allocated 20 ESOs to conduct a target of 2,000 inspections per year. 
The overall strategy is thus to inspect non-complying companies, or those at highest 
risk for non-compliance, in order to bring these companies into compliance. The 
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Dedicated Enforcement Team conducts inspections in sectors that historically have the 
highest rates of non-compliance such as retail, restaurant and business management 
services. Such criteria for targeted inspections are based on violations confirmed 
through individual claims brought forward.  In addition, where sectors of people in 
precarious jobs have been successful in bringing attention to substandard working 
conditions, the MOL has responded with targeted sectoral inspections (e.g., garment 
workers during the 1990s, temporary help agency workers and live-in caregivers in the 
early 2000s).57 There does not appear to be any benchmarking or evaluation program to 
assess changes in compliance rates in the sectors targeted.  
The Administration Manual for Employment Standards (AMES) outlines how 
officers are required to conduct inspections. The ESO generally gives the employer 10 
days notice of the proactive inspection. The employer is asked to prepare payroll 
records for the inspection. The ESO interviews the employer, as well as a selection of 
employees, to identify any violations, and performs a test audit on payroll records (for 
example, in a workplace with 60 or fewer employees, the officer will review 5 
employees’ records). If the ESO identifies ES violations, action is taken to remedy the 
contravention. This action is achieved by the employer doing a self audit to determine 
how much is owed, for example, in unpaid wages, unpaid overtime or public holiday 
pay. If an employer does not make a voluntary payment, the ESO may issue an order to 
pay.  
Inspection results suggest that the purpose of inspections is to encourage employers 
to comply. For example, in 2008-09, of 2,135 inspections covering 60,000 employees, 
over $1.9 million in unpaid wages was uncovered through the inspections. Besides 
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paying wages that should have been paid in the first place, enforcement activity focused 
on encouraging compliance rather than mandating penalties for violations of wage 
standards.  This activity included issuing: 
• 487 tickets (of about $360 each) 
• 2,883 Compliance orders (request compliance by specified time) 
• 68 Notices of Contravention (escalating fines per violation per occurrence); and, 
• 2 orders to pay58 
As Table 2 demonstrates, proactive inspections reveal violations of core standards 
such as minimum wage, unpaid wages and overtime. They also offer greater chances of 
recovering those wages. Moreover, proactive inspections uncover violations of 
standards experienced by currently employed workers, whereas individual claims, more 
typical of reactive approaches, tend to uncover violations reported by workers after the 
employment relationship is severed. This is a key distinction.   
 
Table 2  Comparison of ES Individual Claims to Proactive Inspections 
 Violations confirmed in 
individual claims  2007-2008 
Violations confirmed in 
proactive inspections 2007-
2008 
Unpaid wages  33% 46% 
Vacation pay  
 
24% 6% 
Termination  22% 0 
Overtime 
 
5% 15% 
Public holidays 
 
5% 29% 
Source:  Ontario MOL (2008) Employment Standards Program Annual Report, 2007-2008.  
 
While roughly half of unpaid wages owed are recovered through the individual 
claims process (barring bankruptcy), 92 to 99 percent of unpaid wages confirmed during 
proactive inspections are recovered through this process. This finding, depicted in the 
! %) 
table above, suggests that proactive inspections are more effective than the 
investigation of individual claims in recovering workers unpaid wages.  
 
C.  Assessing Employment Standards Enforcement 
The re-regulation of ES in the late 20th century through inadequate funding, economic 
restructuring, and the shift from proactive measures to individual claims resolution, has 
increasingly placed the onus for enforcement on workers, on the one hand, and 
voluntary compliance by employers, on the other hand.   
The focus of this report is on people in precarious jobs and enforcement 
practices. Precarious jobs are taken to mean work for remuneration, characterized by 
high levels of job and income insecurity, low wages and limited access to regulatory 
protections and employment benefits. Moreover, precarious jobs are often associated 
with temporary employment and self-employment (especially the own account variety, 
where the self-employed person does not employ others), rather than permanent paid 
employment.  Workers in precarious jobs also tend to lack meaningful access to 
employment rights. As precarious employment has developed over recent decades, it 
has become marked increasingly by processes of racialization and gendering, in other 
words the ways in which women, immigrant, migrant and racialized workers are 
incorporated into the labour market, the association of specific forms of employment 
with these groups of workers, and the over-representation of women and racialized 
workers in forms of employment characterized by high levels of insecurity. Furthermore, 
non-racialized and/or Canadian-born workers who work in  particular sectors, and/or 
alongside women, immigrants, migrants and racialized workers, are compelled to labour 
under similar conditions in work that is marked by feminization and racialization.59  
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Precarious employment is not new; in fact, many of these conditions are 
longstanding. They are reminiscent of the “sweating system” of outsourcing in the 
garment industry, of employment practices in employment agencies, and of immigration 
practices during the nation-building periods of the late 1800s.60  It is not the case that all 
employers are violating the ESA or attempting to evade core labour standards. 
However, precarious employment is growing and ES violations, evasion and erosion are 
therefore having a much larger impact on the broader labour market than during 
previous eras. Responsible employers are placed under growing pressure when 
undercut by employers who violate the ESA. As practices linked to precarious 
employment spread across industries, strategies to lower labour costs and liabilities 
also spread. The Ontario government is thus facing increasing numbers of individual 
complaints of employer violation at the same time that employers are shifting forms of 
violation and evasion through ‘new’ employment practices.  As U.S. researchers 
studying precarious employment reflect, “[w]hen the floor of labor standards is driven 
down or dismantled altogether, all of us are affected, not just those at the very 
bottom.”61     
Erosion of employment standards have, as a Law Commission of Canada report 
observes, developed both actively and passively.62  Active erosion of standards has 
occurred through explicit exemptions in the scope of the ESA being adopted through 
regulatory changes. For example, workers in agriculture, information technology, and 
construction do not have the same protections for hours of work and overtime that other 
workers have. Changes to the ESA in 2000 actively reduced government regulation of 
workplace standards, promoted greater employer control over work time, normalized 
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non-standard employment relationships and increased the vulnerability of workers in 
non-unionized workplaces.63  More passive erosion of standards also undermined the 
ESA’s capacity to protect workers in low-wage and precarious jobs. From the late 
1970’s until the early 2000s, Ontario’s minimum wage was substantially below the 
poverty level.64  This degradation has contributed to an expanding low-wage labour 
market in Canada. Data from the OECD show that Canada is second only to the U.S. as 
a low-wage country. The proportion of Canadian workers who are low paid (less than 
two-thirds of the median wage) is about double the level in continental Europe (on the 
magnitude of low wage work in contemporary Ontario, see also Noack and Vosko in this 
LCO series).65    
Active or passive, employers have adopted strategies for work organization over 
the past 3 decades that evade core labour laws and create legal distance between 
themselves and their workers.66 Even harder to quantify than violations of ES are 
practices of evasion, as they often involve workers found in forms of employment 
outside the scope of the ESA or differentiated within the ESA – for example, the growing 
number of workers in forms of employment that fall outside of standard full-time, 
permanent employment with a single employer.67 Over a third of total employment is 
part-time, temporary or own-account self-employment. Yet labour laws, regulatory 
regimes and employment benefits are still based almost exclusively on an employment 
model (a standard employment relationship) developed after World War II, which linked 
decent wages, benefits, working conditions and job security to a full-time continuous 
employment relationship between an employer and worker where the worker works on 
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the employer’s premises under direct supervision, a form of employment in which non-
racialized men were over-represented.68  
Historic exclusions of certain types of work organization from ES protections, 
such as own-account self-employment, have created incentives for employers to move 
workers into “new” forms of employment. Contracting out work that can be done in-
house is yet another practice that is re-emerging and it has surfaced in sectors from the 
newspaper industry to home care provision. Contracting out was a common practice in 
garment production and manufacturing more generally in the beginning of the 20th 
century. Externalizing employment costs to temporary help agencies is yet another 
growing strategy for just-in-time labour sourcing. Such practices shift the legal liability 
that employers have for their employees, working conditions and employment benefits 
onto intermediaries and, in the case of misclassified independent contractors (i.e., self-
employed workers), onto workers themselves. While employers may argue that these 
strategies are necessary in an increasingly global market with intense international 
competition, this rationale does not justify these practices in Ontario. Many employers 
and industries that are engaged in outsourcing, indirect hiring, and misclassifying 
workers are part of distinctly local markets, such as restaurants, business services 
including janitorial and courier services, construction, trucking, home health care, 
warehousing and manufacturing of locally consumed goods.69  
Few studies document the scope of violations of ES; but the ones that are 
available confirm substantial formal violations. In the late 1990’s, a federal government 
Labour Standards Evaluation surveyed employers and found that 25 percent of 
employers were in widespread violation of the Canada Labour Code and 50 percent 
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were in partial violation.70 These findings were confirmed a decade later by Statistics 
Canada71 and the Workers’ Action Centre.72   
A survey of people in low-wage and precarious work in the Greater Toronto Area 
conducted in 2011 provides yet another window into the violations that some of these 
workers face. This non-randomized survey of 520 casual, temporary, non-standard and 
low-wage workers conducted in 2011 sought to document the types of violations people 
in precarious work face.  The findings included the following:   
• 20 percent earned less than minimum wage 
• 39 percent failed to receive earned overtime pay 
• 36 percent were fired or laid off without termination pay or notice 
• 34 percent struggled to get vacation pay 
• 33 percent were owed wages and of those only 23 per cent were ever paid73 
These findings do not indicate that all or most employers violate ES. Many employers 
do comply with the ESA. However, the prevalence of violations undermines employers 
who do comply with minimum labour standards and contributes to a downward pressure 
on wages and working conditions.   
Over the past 30 years, resources and staffing for ES regulation has not kept 
pace with increases in workers’ covered, number of workplaces and complexity of 
working relationships. While the number of workers covered by the ESA has increased 
by fully 24 percent between 1997 and 2007, the funding for the ES Program has 
decreased by fully 33 percent. Even recent increases to the Program in the 2009/10 
budget leave it with funding levels of over 10 percent below 1997 levels.74 With over 
370,000 Ontario workplaces, ES regulation is made more difficult by the growth in 
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smaller companies. Companies employing fewer than 50 employees make up more 
than 92 percent of Ontario’s businesses and 66 percent of ESA claims in 2009/10.75   
1. Effectiveness of ESA regulation 
The growing trend towards individualized and privatized systems of workplace 
regulation is increasing workers’ exposure to market forces. Ontario ES regulation uses 
a mix of “hard” law and “soft” law approaches. Soft law approaches include the 
government’s reliance on voluntary employer compliance or self-regulatory behaviour 
from firms. Detection of violations is largely individualized through workers’ self 
enforcement and individual claims. Hard law approaches are reserved for employers 
that do not voluntarily comply with assessed violations. These include orders to pay, 
compliance orders, and fines or prosecution for particularly egregious employers.  
(i) Self enforcement / Individualization of claims  
The majority of resources for enforcing ES still go towards investigating individual 
complaints of employer violations. This despite the fact that, as Saunders and Dutil 
note, the “practice of dealing with compliance one case at a time is expensive and risks 
overloading the available capacity.”76  There has been an increase in claims over the 
last 5 years from an average of 15,000 claims per year to over 20,000 claims per year. 
By 2010, a backlog in workers’ complaints against employers for unpaid wages had 
grown to over 17,000.77  
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 (ii)  Barriers to self-enforcement while on the job. 
On an annual basis, less than 1 percent of workplaces are at risk of being inspected for 
ES violations. Enforcement of ES and MOL detection of violations largely relies on 
individual workers. Yet workers, particularly those in low-wage and precarious work, 
face significant challenges to enforcing their employment standards while still on the 
job. The ESA is supposed to remedy the unequal power relationship between workers 
and employers. There are no institutionalized mechanisms that enable employee voice 
in ES enforcement. Unlike Ontario’s regulation of the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act, workers cannot make anonymous complaints that will initiate MOL Health and 
Safety inspections of the workplace. Nor is there interim reinstatement pending 
investigation that is afforded to fired workers in specific situations under the Ontario 
Labour Relations Act (OLRA)   
There are many factors shaping how workers respond to ES violations. Workers 
must consider factors such as: wages needed to support themselves and their families; 
savings; eligibility for and capacity to survive on Employment Insurance benefits while 
searching for new employment; the realities of getting another job at the same or similar 
wages; the impacts on immigration status and family sponsorship; and whether they will 
be successful in securing the minimum ES they should have received in the first place. 
Workers under the Live-in Caregiver and Temporary Foreign Worker Programs face 
even greater challenges. Caregivers must complete the equivalent of 24 months of 
employment within 4 years before being able to apply for permanent residency and are 
required to live in their employer’s home.  People who work under the Seasonal 
Agricultural Program and low-skill Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) are tied 
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to one employer for a specific term.  Federal immigration program requirements create 
conditions ripe for abuse and that limit what workers can do to address violations.78   
Workers without regularized immigration status have the same ESA rights as 
other workers. But non-status workers face substantial barriers to enforcing their rights; 
many in this group face substandard conditions of employment but do not complain due 
to implicit or explicit threats of reporting their status to immigration officials and the 
potential of deportation.   
Workers’ ability and willingness to confront employers over ES violations is also 
shaped by labour market conditions. Worker’s decisions may be shaped by their ability 
to get a new job at the same or better pay and job security. For workers facing 
substandard employment conditions, the fraying social safety net reduces workers’ 
options even more. While Ontario had the third highest unemployment rate in 2009, it 
had the lowest level of EI coverage with only 41.3 percent of unemployed workers 
receiving EI benefits.79 Workers that do qualify are only eligible for 55 percent of their 
previous wages. For people in low-wage work, EI does not buttress workers displaced 
from their jobs for trying to enforce their rights. Besides benefit levels well below the 
poverty line, social assistance is not an option for many people who are trying to 
regularize their immigration status or sponsor family members. Barriers to filing claims 
while workers are on the job result in some workers being owed substantial amounts of 
unpaid wages and entitlements. However the $10,000 cap on monies recoverable under 
the ESA leaves these workers without remedy through the ES claim process.  
Together these factors result in substantial barriers to workers in pursuing their 
ES rights. Power imbalances leave workers with little protection against reprisal or job 
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loss. It is little surprise that 9 out of 10 workers who file claims for unpaid wages and 
entitlements do so after they have left the job.80  It is hard to know how many workers 
move from one substandard job to the next, without seeking to recover unpaid wages, 
overtime, vacation, termination and public holiday pay.  A MOL Inspection of a textile 
company in 2004 found that 99 workers were owed more than $136,000 in wages. Yet 
only 22 workers had come forward to file ES claims in the months prior to the company 
closing down, despite considerable media attention about the case in question.  Almost 
80 percent of the workers never came forward to make claims for their unpaid wages. 
This case suggests that the 15,000 to 20,000 claims filed each year may only be the tip 
of the iceberg.  
 (iii)  Barriers in individual claims  
Workers are now required to first seek compliance from employers before being allowed 
to file an ES claim for unpaid wages. This effectively means that workers must have 
access to the internet to learn about rights, knowledge about how to apply abstract legal 
rights to their specific conditions, the ability to gather evidence to prove their case, and, 
the time and facilities to assemble, package, and deliver it to (former) employers. Most 
significantly, mandatory self-enforcement requires that workers have the skill set and 
confidence to confront their (former) employer about violations.     
There are substantial structural power imbalances between workers and 
employers that the ESA seeks to address. Such imbalances in power can create 
significant fears in workers.  A mandatory requirement for workers to contact their 
employer about wages contravenes the purposes of the ESA, both its four fundamental 
underlying normative principles (i.e., fairness, social minima, decent work, and 
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universality) and its role of providing workers with an administrative process through 
which to seek redress for contraventions of the Act.  
The MOL’s ES complaints system relies heavily on individuals being able to 
access the website. Reliance on internet access creates significant barriers for many 
people in precarious employment. Statistics Canada reports that there is a digital divide 
in the rate of internet use on the basis of income, education and age. If someone is 
poor, older, lives in a rural community, was born outside of Canada, and/or has 
relatively low levels of education, s/he is less likely to use or have use of the internet.81 
Recent immigrants often have low incomes and hold highly precarious temporary and 
part-time jobs. It is workers in such situations, who also often face language barriers, 
who are most in need of ES protection and assistance in accessing these rights.  
ES stand alone in the regulation of employment rights in having no government 
or quasi-government funded assistance for workers who believe their rights have been 
violated. The government provides direct and indirect funding for information, education 
and legal support in areas of Health and Safety, Workplace Safety and Insurance and 
Human Rights, (e.g., Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers, Office of the 
Workers Advisor, Human Rights Legal Support Centre). Few legal supports exist for 
workers requiring assistance with ESA matters. Ontario’s Community Legal Clinic 
system provided ESA representation in 86 cases, 90 brief services and advice for just 
over 850 workers in 2008.82 There are no legal aid certificates for ESA matters. 
Furthermore, the $10,000 cap on ESA claims means that few private bar lawyers would 
represent workers on ESA matters. Workers are left to learn how to make a complaint 
on their own. Workers have to go back and forth between the ESA guide (over 100 
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pages), the guide to the claim form, and the claim form itself, often going through the 
three documents on the MOL website.  Workers may not only need legal information 
about ES, but also knowledge about how to connect that information to their particular 
situations. They may also need assistance in determining entitlements, in preparing the 
narrative of what happened, and in identifying supporting documentation.   The MOL 
does not provide this assistance. The ESA has a time limit of 6 months to file a claim. 
Job dislocation and difficulties learning how to pursue ES rights means some workers 
only find out about the ES claims process after the 6 month limitation period has 
passed. The claims process is difficult for workers who are not proficient in written 
English. A 2008 study on linguistic access to legal services provides a rough estimate 
that as many as half a million people in Ontario might need an interpreter in pursuing 
legal matters.83 There are no language interpretation services to assist in the filing of 
claims or investigation of claims. Workers are left to rely on support from friends, family 
or community members to assist them in filing a claim.   
Literacy is also a factor in enforcing ES through the claims process as workers 
are required to submit a claim form to initiate investigation. Low levels of literacy affects 
labour market outcomes in a way that establishes a strong link between employability, 
income and literacy proficiency. People with lower literacy are more likely to be pulled 
into low-wage and precarious work where higher rates of violations occur. Furthermore, 
linking literacy and social position, the International Survey of Reading Skills found that 
“individuals with low literacy skills were older, less educated, immigrants or had a 
mother tongue other than English or French.”84 Even though the ESA is a rights-
conferring piece of legislation, the process for addressing violations of those rights has 
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shifted to dispute resolution.  Workers are expected not only to make a complaint about 
the violation but also to make their own case that the employer has violated their rights. 
When the employer holds all of the employment records, this process can be time 
consuming, with ESOs going back and forth between employer and employee. If there 
are fact-finding meetings, workers, who are often in another job, must take time off from 
employment, generally without pay.  There is no remedy under the ESA to provide 
workers with compensation for the substantial time and resources spent trying to obtain 
the wages and entitlements they have earned, much less any interest on wages that 
may go unpaid for well over a year.   
2. Minimum Wage 
The Canadian economy has grown in the past 30 years. However, an increasingly 
unequal distribution of the rewards of employment is leaving more workers struggling to 
get by. In Ontario, provincially-regulated minimum wages have institutionalized low 
wages that fail to keep up with the cost of living. Indeed, Ontario’s minimum wage has 
fallen 21 percent below the peak levels of the mid-1970s. A person working in Toronto 
full-time at minimum wage ($10.25 an hour) has earnings that leave her below Statistics 
Canada’s Low Income Cut-Off (LICO).85  Anyone working at minimum wage and 
supporting a family would earn well below the LICO. Recent immigrants are particularly 
hard hit by low wages. Racialized women workers earn 47 percent less than non-
racialized men and 15 percent less than non-racialized women workers.86 This is due, in 
part, to the lack of recognition of non-Canadian credentials, experience, and expertise.87  
To return to the principle of decency outlined at the beginning of this report, as 
Arthurs concludes in his review of the federal labour code, “no worker should be paid so 
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little, that, after working full-time at a regular job for a full year they still find themselves 
with less money than they need to live at or just above the poverty line.”88  At present 
there is no policy formula under the ESA to determine the level of minimum wages. 
Rather, they are increased in an ad hoc manner.   
3.  Compliance, Self-regulation and Enforcement 
The MOL announced recently that the backlog of claims will be eliminated by March 
2012, at which point it will partner and consult with employer and employee groups as it 
shifts resources to inspections: “through our enhanced compliance strategy, we will 
continue reaching out to employers through a mix of education, outreach and 
enforcement to help ensure we stem any problems before they arise and enforce the 
legislation”.89 
The compliance model of ES regulation assumes that virtue will trump employer 
self-interest.90 One report prepared by the MOL states: 
…[e]mployers want to comply with the law because it is the right thing to do. The 
ministry is helping them to do just that. Employers also want to comply with the 
Employment Standards Act because they know it benefits them – compliance can 
reduce legal costs, improve staff retention and increase productivity. The vast majority of 
employers know that a fair workplace is a productive and efficient workplace – making 
for a better bottom line.91  
This view eclipses employers that face conflicts between ES compliance and profits, 
particularly when competing with employers operating below minimum standards.  
Further, this view of employer behaviour does not recognize the power imbalances 
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between employers and employees that the ESA is intended to address. While the MOL 
establishes targeted inspections for those at high risk of violation, it leaves a core model 
of employer self-regulation and reliance on employer voluntary compliance.92  
4.  ESA Gaps and Loopholes 
The way work is organized has changed drastically over the past 30 years  The 
ESA does not address these new forms of work organization creating institutional 
incentives to reduce employer liabilities.  
As noted above, unions are prevented from filing ESA complaints. As the 
discussion of OHS later in this paper demonstrates, the participation of unions in the 
regulation of OHS has strengthened both health and safety standards and their 
enforcement. Arguably, the separation of the collectivized voice of unions from non-
unionized workers has weakened ES regulation, particularly in terms of testing new 
forms of work at appeals of ESO decisions at the Ontario Labour Relations Board and 
pressure for improved minimum standards from which to bargain from.  
History demonstrates that employers create new, unforeseen and unprotected 
work arrangements. That is why an essential step to improving enforcement must be to 
expand the scope of the ESA to include all who work and all work arrangements. In this 
way we remove the incentives and statutory mechanisms allowing employers to move 
some forms of work beyond the reach of employment standards. By requiring all work to 
meet basic minimum employment standards, we can finally establish a level playing 
field for employers and a minimum floor of rights and standards for workers and society.  
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III. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY (OHS)  
A. Ontario Legislation -- The Occupational Health and Safety Act 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) is the principal vehicle through which 
the Ontario government protects Ontario’s workers from being exposed to unacceptably 
hazardous working conditions.  It does so by imposing duties on employers, 
supervisors, workers and others to comply with standards established by the Act and 
the regulations made pursuant to it.  As well, it requires the employer to establish a 
system to manage OHS that includes the appointment of competent supervisors, 
preparation of a written OHS policy, and provision of information to health and safety 
representatives or joint health and safety committees.  The legislation also provides for 
workers to be involved in OHS management at their workplaces through a right to know 
about hazards in the workplace, a right to participate through the appointment of health 
and safety representatives, and a right to refuse unsafe work without the threat of 
retaliation for doing so.   
 The Workplace Safety and Insurance Act is involved in prevention principally 
through the provision of financial incentives administered through its various experience 
rating plans.  It used to also be involved in prevention through its supervision of safe 
workplace associations and other educational and promotional activities.  However, 
recently, in response to recommendations from the Expert Advisory Panel on 
Occupational Health and Safety, known as the Dean Report,93 these functions were 
transferred to the OHS Division (OHSD) of the MOL by Bill 160 (2011).   
! '$ 
 Since this report is focused on enforcement and compliance, these educational 
and promotional aspects of the MOL’s mandate are not reviewed here, although they 
are discussed in the context of best practices.  The discussion of enforcement, 
however, necessarily considers the management systems dimension of the OHSA 
legislation since the two dimensions of the legislation cannot be separated.   
 Indeed, it is useful at this point to draw out a distinction between two different 
kinds of regulation.  On the one hand, the OHSA, and the regulations promulgated 
under it, sets out specific standards that must be obeyed.  For example, designated 
substance regulations limit worker exposure to various harmful substances such as lead 
and asbestos.  These are known as specification standards.  On the other hand, the 
OHSA also requires employers to create or engage in certain processes to manage 
OHS.  A good example is the recent violence and harassment sections of the Act that 
require employers to prepare policies that have a certain minimum content, conduct a 
risk assessment, and provide workers with information and instruction (OHSA, Part 
III.01).  These are known as process standards.   
 The OHSA applies to nearly all provincially regulated employers and binds the 
Crown (s.2).  Sections of the Act also apply to independent contractors (s.4).  It does 
not, however, apply to work performed by the owner or occupant, or a servant of the 
owner or occupant in or about a private residence (s. 3(1)).  As a result, domestic 
workers employed by the owner or occupant fall outside the act, a matter of some 
concern given the precarious and vulnerable situation of such workers.  
 Unlike most employment law, the OHSA is not built on the platform of the 
contract of employment.  Rather, rights and duties depend on establishing a “worker” 
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status.  Worker is defined as “a person who performs work or supplies services for 
monetary compensation” (s. 1). Also, employer is defined as a person who employs one 
or more persons or contracts for the services of one or more workers, and includes a 
contractor or a subcontractor who performs work or supplies services. As a result, an 
employer owes the same duties to self-employed persons it hires as it does to 
employees.  Thus, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently held that a 
company that hires truck drivers as independent contractors was nevertheless required 
to establish a joint health and safety committee because it regularly employed twenty or 
more workers.94   
 Inspectors have broad powers to enforce the OHSA.  They are authorized to 
enter into any workplace at any time without a warrant or notice (s. 54(1)).  The only 
exception to this is with respect to dwellings used as workplaces.  In this setting, 
inspectors may only enter with the consent of the occupier or under the authority of a 
warrant (s. 54(2)).  Again, this exception may be significant for some precarious or 
vulnerable workers who are working at home. 
 Once in the workplace inspectors have authority to examine and handle 
equipment and materials that are present, to require production of documents, to 
conduct tests, to be accompanied and assisted by experts, to require the employer to 
conduct tests, etc (s. 54(1)).  The inspector is also authorized to question any person 
and every person must assist the inspector in the performance of her or his duties (s. 
62). Where the inspection becomes an investigation into a suspected violation of the Act 
because the inspector has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence 
has been committed, a warrant will be required and can be obtained under the act.95 
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 Where the inspector finds a violation of the Act, he or she has a variety of 
enforcement powers.  The inspector can issue an order to comply and specify either 
that the order be carried out forthwith or at some specified date in the future (s. 57(1)).  
The inspector may also order the employer to submit a compliance plan (s. 57(4)).  
Where the inspector finds that the violation presents a danger or hazard to the safety of 
a worker, he or she can issue a stop work order.  Work may not be resumed until the 
inspector withdraws the order after an inspection.  However, work may be resumed 
pending an inspection if a worker representative advises the inspector that in her or his 
opinion the order has been complied with (s. 57(6-7)).  Inspectors’ orders may be 
appealed to the Ontario Labour Relations Board within 30 days and the Board has the 
power to suspend the operation of the order pending a disposition of the appeal (s. 61). 
 Inspectors do not have the power to prosecute violations of the act although they 
can recommend that a prosecution take place.  They may, however, issue tickets under 
Part I of the Provincial Offences Act (POA) for contraventions of the Act that are listed in 
schedules issued pursuant to O. Reg. 950 promulgated under the POA.  There is a set 
fine that may be paid without a court appearance or a defendant may elect to have the 
charge tried.  Employers, supervisors and workers can be ticketed.  The ticketing power 
was substantially enlarged in 2005.  Previously, tickets had been used in construction 
but they now cover a much wider range of contraventions.  There are now 81 ticketable 
offences.  Workers are the target of 30, supervisors the target of 31, and employers of 
21.96  The set fine is determined by the Senior Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice.  
They were last updated at the beginning of 2010.  Current fines are either $195 or $295 
per offence.97  Inspectors can also issue summonses under Part I for any violation of 
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the OHSA.  When a summons is issued, the defendant must make a court appearance 
and the maximum fine on conviction is $1000. 
 More serious offences are prosecuted under Part III of the POA.  The decision to 
prosecute is made by the Legal Services Branch (LSB) of the MOL, which also 
conducts the prosecution.  Defendants can raise a due diligence defense but they bear 
the burden of proving that they took every precaution reasonable in the circumstances 
to comply with the law.  Upon being convicted, an individual may be fined up to $25,000 
or to a prison term of not more than 12 months, or both.  A corporation may be fined up 
to $500,000.   
 Finally, it should also be noted that employers may also be charged under the 
Criminal Code.  While in theory employers always could be charged with criminal 
offences, such as criminal negligence, historically it had been attempted rarely and 
succeeded only once.98 The enactment of the so-called Westray Bill, Bill C-45, in 2003 
facilitated the prosecution of such charges.  It imposes a duty on all persons “directing 
the work of others” to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of workers and the 
public.  It also creates new rules for attributing criminal liability to organizations, 
including corporations, and identifies factors that should be used to sentence an 
organization convicted of a criminal offence. 
 In sum, OHS law imposes enforceable duties on employers, supervisors, workers 
and others to provide a safe and healthy workplace, to adopt specified OHS 
management practices and to work safely.  To obtain compliance with these duties, 
OHS inspectors can choose from among a wide range of measures.  In addition to non-
statutory mechanisms, such as providing advice and persuading, enforcement actions 
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range from issuing an order to launching a criminal prosecution.  The important 
question, which the next section addresses, is how these powers are exercised. 
 B. Mapping OHS Enforcement 
The translation from law on the books to law in action is crucial to the effectiveness of 
any regulatory scheme, including OHS.  This section examines the current practice of 
OHS compliance and enforcement activities by the MOL.  Before doing so, however, a 
bit of background on the history of OHS enforcement is necessary since patterns of past 
practice may play a role in shaping current ones.  
 OHS regulation has its modern roots in late nineteenth-century factory legislation.  
The Ontario Factories Act was passed in 1884 and came into force 2 years later.  The 
Act contained special provisions regarding child and female labour, but also set general 
health and safety standards for all workplaces covered by the Act.  In addition to a 
general duties clause, the law made provision for machine guarding, sanitation, lighting, 
ventilation etc.  Crucially, it also provided for the appointment of inspectors who were 
empowered to enter workplaces and issue orders.  Violation of the Act was an offence 
punishable by fine and imprisonment.    
 Consistent with the practice of factory inspectors in other jurisdictions, Ontario’s 
factory inspectors adopted a persuasion model of enforcement.  Employers were 
advised about problems in their workplaces and recommendations for improvement 
were made.  Prosecutions were almost never launched.  Inspectors justified this 
approach on the basis that it was more effective in securing compliance from employers 
who were generally disposed to comply with the law.  Trade unionists, however, took a 
very different view, arguing that the act was not being enforced and that, as a result, 
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workers were being killed and injured at alarming rates. This was especially so in the 
wake of a second industrial revolution beginning in the late-nineteenth century, which 
was marked by more mechanization and labour intensification.99  
 Without reviewing debates about the effectiveness of the persuasion strategy, 
the important point here is that it became institutionally entrenched so that the default 
practice of inspectors was to engage with employers in a manner that minimized 
conflict.  Essentially, inspectors sought to advance workplace health and safety by 
providing advice and attempting to convince employers to take remedial measures.  
Prosecution was a last resort and was resorted to rarely. 
 This institutional practice received a new impetus when OHS laws were 
revamped in the late 1970s to create the legislative framework described in the previous 
section.  It will be recalled that among the law’s many innovations was the addition of 
what is now described as an occupational health and safety management (OHSM) 
approach to regulation, which required employers to adopt certain processes to create 
what was then called an internal responsibility system (IRS).  This existed alongside a 
more traditional external responsibility system (ERS) that built on specification 
standards and their enforcement.   
 In the years immediately following the enactment of OHSA, the government 
adopted a policy of promoting the IRS with a view that the ERS would play a secondary 
role, dealing with the projected minority of situations in which the IRS failed to function 
effectively and, at a minimum, achieve compliance with the minimum specification 
standards.  As a result, inspectors were instructed to minimize the number of 
enforcement actions they took and instead to get the workplace parties to work 
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cooperatively through the joint health and safety committee to better address OHS 
concerns and problems.100  Such an approach to inspection and enforcement was 
consistent with the traditional practices of inspectors under the previous regime.   
 Needless to say, this approach proved to be terribly controversial and worker 
OHS activists decried what they perceived to be a failure of enforcement, much in the 
way their predecessors had in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.  Ontario 
governments responded to this pressure in a variety of ways, including amendments to 
the OHSA that more deeply institutionalized joint health and safety committees and that 
increased penalties (Bill 208, S.O. 1990, c. 7.). However, it was not until the mid-1990s 
that a significant change in enforcement practice was implemented, putting greater 
emphasis on the ERS, entailing both more enforcement actions by the inspectors and 
prosecutions for offences, especially when violations resulted in fatalities or serious 
injuries.101 This pattern of practice, which still prevails, will now be described in more 
detail. 
 There are many measures of enforcement practice.  A logical way of mapping is 
to start with the most basic intervention, in this case simply the fact of an inspection, 
and to move up to the more assertive measures, here ending with criminal 
prosecutions. 
1. Inspections 
As Graph 3 demonstrates, in recent years there has been an upwards trend in the 
activity levels of inspectors, which has been supported by an increase in the 
complement of inspectors.  Between 2005 and 2010, the government doubled the 
number of OHS inspectors to a total of 430. 
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Graph 3. OHS Investigation and Inspections 
 
 
 Field activity is the broadest category and includes any visit by an inspector to a 
workplace to enforce the OHSA.  It includes inspections, investigations and 
consultations.  Inspections are a subset of field activity and include visits to monitor 
compliance and to promote the IRS.  These activities are proactive in that they are 
planned according to criteria devised by the OHSD.  By contrast, investigations are 
reactive in the sense that they occur for the purpose of investigating a fatality or critical 
injury, complaint or work refusal.  Consultations are a small component of field activity 
and have not been included in this chart. 
 What these data show is not only that field activity has significantly increased 
over the past twenty years, but that the greatest share of this is the result of an increase 
in proactive investigations.  It is necessary, therefore, to say a few words about the 
criteria that are used to schedule proactive investigations.  It is infeasible address the 
allocation criteria used over the entire 20-year period. Thus, what follows focuses on the 
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most recent strategy adopted by OHSD beginning in 2005/06, which is now known as 
Safe At Work Ontario.102 The OHSD has adopted a risk-based approach to regulation in 
which they target workplaces for inspection based on a publicly stated set of criteria that 
include:  
• injury rates and claims cost 
• compliance history 
• hazards inherent to the work 
• new businesses 
• size of business 
• specific events or incidents such as critical injuries and fatalities 
• the presence of new and/or vulnerable workers103 
 On the basis of these criteria, sector plans are drawn up that specify how 
proactive inspection resources will be deployed.  The most recent set of plans cover 
2011-12.  Within this context, heightened enforcement campaigns, better known as 
“Safety Blitzes” are planned and announced in advance.  For example, for the industrial 
sector, five safety blitzes are planned for the year: new and younger workers; tower 
crane suppliers; personal protective equipment; racking and storage; and 
musculoskeletal disorders.104 
 This leads to the next question: what do inspectors do during a field visit?  There 
are actually no field studies that have been conducted examining the practice of 
inspection and so this description is based on both documentary and statistical sources.  
Inspectors are accompanied by the employer and a worker representative who is 
entitled to be paid for the time spent.  Where there is no worker representative, the 
! (- 
inspector is required by statute to consult with a “reasonable” number of workers who 
are physically present (s. 54(3-5).  The Act does not specify whether the inspector is to 
consult with workers outside of the presence of the employer and the normal practice is 
unclear. 
 At the end of an inspection, the inspector prepares a report that may make 
recommendations and, if there are contraventions a written order to comply within a set 
time frame will be issued.  If there is a contravention that creates an immediate danger 
to a worker or a member of the public, the inspector may issue a stop work order.  
Graph 4 presents data on the frequency of these orders over the past 20 years. 
 
Graph 4. OHS Orders 
 
 
 These data indicate there has been an increase in orders and stop work orders 
that is consistent with the increase in inspection activity, which is evidence that the 
increase in inspections is not merely cosmetic, in the sense of simply bumping up the 
numbers, but that enforcement powers are being exercised during these visits, including 
the stop work power which has immediate consequences to the employer.   
! ($ 
  
2. Prosecutions 
Data on prosecutions is kept by the LSB, which over the years has changed the way it 
records its activities.  As a result, it is more difficult to construct a time series.  There are 
however, data from 1993 for fines and from 1997 for convictions that indicate an 
increase in prosecutions and fines, particularly since 2005 (Graph 5). 
 
Graph 5. OHS Penalties 
.  
 
 The picture is nevertheless complicated because the data includes both Part I 
and Part III prosecutions, which means that the numbers after 2005 are inflated by the 
expansion of the ticketing system, which permits inspectors to impose on-the-spot fines 
on employers, supervisors and workers.  In practice, workers and supervisors receive 
about 37 percent of summonses each, while employers receive 25 percent.  As Garry 
Gray has noted, this targeting blurs the definition of who is an OHS offender and 
diffuses responsibility.105  It also has resulted in a reduction in the average fine per 
conviction (Graph 6).   
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Graph 6. OHS Prosecutions        
 
 Data that disaggregates Part I and Part III prosecutions have been obtained from 
the LSB for 3 years, 2007/08 to 2009/10.  The data show that while, on the one hand, 
there has been an increase in the more serious Part III prosecutions over these years, 
from 369 in 2007/08 to 445 in 2009/10, on the other, the average fine per conviction for 
these more serious offences has been declined from $35,303 to $28,839.106   
 There has been little resort to the use of the criminal sanctions notwithstanding 
the enactment of Bill C-45, which came into force in 2004. Across Canada, less than 10 
criminal charges have been laid.  Three criminal cases have been brought in Ontario. 
The first charge criminal charge arose out of ditch collapse that killed a worker in 
Newmarket, Ontario.  The charge was laid in 2004 and was resolved by a plea deal in 
which the criminal charge was dropped in exchange for a guilty plea to violations under 
the OHS statute.107  The second criminal prosecution in Ontario was launched against 
Millenium Crane, the company’s owner, and the crane operator at the time. However, in 
this case too the charges were dropped after an engineering report failed to support the 
prosecution’s case.108  The third prosecution, which is pending at the time of writing, 
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arose out of a scaffolding collapse that killed four workers on Christmas Eve 2009.  The 
accused include the Metron Construction Co. and three of its officials.109 
 In Quebec, two cases have resulted in a conviction.  In Transpavé Inc., involving 
a workplace fatality, the accused pleaded guilty and was fined $110,000.00.110  The first 
conviction after a trial was obtained against Pasquale Scrocca, a landscape contractor.  
In that case, an employee died when the brakes on a backhoe Mr. Scrocca was driving 
failed, pinning the employee against a wall. Scrocca received a conditional sentence of 
imprisonment for two years less a day to be served in the community with conditions, 
including a curfew.111  One case, R. v. Gagné, Steve Lemieux and Simon Gagné, ended 
with an acquittal.  In that case, charges were laid following a collision between a train 
and a maintenance vehicle, which resulted in one death and three injuries.  The two 
accused individuals were employees of Québec-Cartier: Steve Lemieux, was the train 
operator, and Simon Gagné, was a foreman.  Justice Dionne found that the mistakes 
made by the employees arose from a corporate culture of tolerance and deficient 
training, not wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of workers on the 
part of the accused. In principle, this finding could have resulted in a conviction of the 
corporation, but it had not been charged.112  There is at least one case still pending, 
against Mark Hritchuk, the service manager at a car dealership, where an employee 
died after catching fire due to a broken fuel pump.113 
 Finally, in British Columbia, the United Steel Workers launched a private 
prosecution in 2010, arising out of the death of a Weyerhauser employee in British 
Columbia in 2004.  The company was previously assessed a penalty of nearly $300,000 
by the BC compensation board.  A court has ruled that the union presented enough 
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evidence for the case to go forward, but the Crown subsequently intervened to 
terminate the prosecution.114    
 Overall, the experience so far of using the Criminal Code to prosecute 
corporations and individuals for OHS crimes is proving to be difficult.  In Ontario, two of 
the three prosecutions ended with the criminal charges being withdrawn.  The third case 
is still pending.  Convictions have been obtained in two cases in Quebec. In the  
Transpavé case, the corporation was sentenced to a fine of $100,000.00 which was 
significantly higher than the maximum penalty ($20,000) then available under Quebec 
health and safety law. The only jail sentence was against a small business operator who 
was personally operating the equipment that caused the death.  While it is possible that 
the threat of criminal prosecution has a broader general deterrent effect, and may be 
used to leverage guilty pleas under provincial legislation, more research would be 
needed to establish whether that is so. 
 The analysis returns to an evaluation of the practice of OHS enforcement in 
subsequent sections on best practices. However, it is worth emphasizing here that 
proactive inspections, reactive inspections with prosecutions for violations that harm 
workers, and workers’ voice are all strongly embedded in the enforcement regime, in 
addition to voluntary compliance measures, and that although the relative importance of 
each has varied over time, these features have survived through Progressive 
Conservative, Liberal and New Democratic Party governments.  Indeed, except perhaps 
for a short period immediately after the enactment of the OHSA, a strong commitment to 
state enforcement has undergirded the OHS regulation regime in Ontario. 
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IV. COMPARISON OF ES AND OHS ENFORCEMENT IN ONTARIO 
The purpose of this brief section is to compare and contrast ES and OHS enforcement 
in Ontario globally, as well as on the dimensions of proactive, reactive, and voluntary 
enforcement.   
A. Global Assessment 
At the most general level, it is clear that OHS regulation and enforcement is far more 
proactive and focused on preventing violations than ES enforcement. The latter is 
largely dominated by individual complaints about violations that have occurred with a 
much smaller role played by proactive inspections or other preventive measures.  This 
difference is manifest not just in the allocation of enforcement resources between 
proactive and reactive inspections, but is also evident with respect to voluntary 
enforcement. Worker voice in the ES scheme is almost exclusively a reactive voice 
heard through complaints about violations that have occurred. This tendency has been 
furthered by recent changes that require, in most cases, that workers first contact the 
employer before an official complaint will be entertained by the MOL.  The picture in 
OHS regulation is different insofar as employers are required to establish a system for 
managing OHS in order to prevent violations from occurring in the first instance and 
workers are given a voice in the detection and correction of problems before violations 
materialize or, failing that, before violations result in work injuries.  Moreover, workers 
are not required to first exercise their voice internally before seeking enforcement 
action.  They can always call an inspector. 
 While, on the one hand, these differences might seem to be perfectly 
understandable based on the difference between wage and hour violations that, in 
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principle, can be corrected by financially compensating the worker, compared to health 
and safety hazards that might materialize in death and disablement for which financial 
compensation can never be adequate.  On the other hand, the differences can also be 
overstated.  Workers who experience ES violations, especially ones that persist over 
time, may suffer losses to the quality of their lives and the lives of those who depend on 
their incomes that are not fully redressed even if full compensation is paid retroactively.  
Enforcement of a minimum floor of ES standards is central to labour market regulation. 
Further, as the Ontario provincial government recognizes in its Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, ES are key to creating fair wages and working conditions and reducing 
poverty.115 For these and other reasons, including advancement of the broader 
principles of decent work, social minima, universality, and fairness, the prevention of ES 
violations is also an important public policy goal that currently is not being pursued to 
nearly the same extent that it is in OHS regulation. 
 Although the best practices section to follow returns to this theme, in a report for 
a project on vulnerable workers, it is also important to emphasize that this group of 
workers is most dependent on a strong, state-centred regime for the enforcement of 
their rights, whether it be in the realm of ES or OHS.  Voluntary compliance is less likely 
to succeed in an environment in which workers are least likely to know their rights and 
most vulnerable to retaliation or its threat, even when retaliation is unlawful.  For the 
same reasons, reactive enforcement in response to complaints is also less effective for 
vulnerable workers.  Proactive enforcement, supplemented by meaningful participation 
by worker organizations so that workers’ voices can be heard in the regulatory regime, 
is essential. 
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B.  Voluntary Compliance 
Substantial reliance is placed on voluntary compliance in ES and OHS regulation in the 
sense that both systems are built around the assumption that most employers are 
motivated to obey the law and have the capacity to do so, especially if they are provided 
with a modest level of compliance assistance by the MOL or other agencies.  
 In the case of ES, the MOL provides information to both employers and 
employees through phone, email, and its website.  The more important innovation, 
however, has been the addition of a requirement that workers who believe they have 
suffered an ES violation first attempt to resolve the matter with their employer before an 
ES complaint will be accepted by the MOL.  Clearly, the objective is to encourage 
workers to become more self-reliant, give employers the chance to correct errors when 
they are pointed out to them, and to reduce the flow of complaints to employment 
standards officers.   
 In the context of OHS, voluntary compliance is not only a major goal, but it is one 
that is supported by a much broader range of institutional arrangement than is the case 
in ES.  Not only does the MOL provide information, the law requires the establishment 
of internal responsibility systems that involve training, information sharing, worker 
participation, etc.  As well, for many years the workers’ compensation system had a 
mandate to improve accident prevention which it did in a variety of ways, not the least of 
which was to fund safe workplace organizations that provided information, training and 
support around OHS issues.  Recently, the prevention mandate was shifted to the MOL 
and is overseen by a Prevention Council and a Chief Prevention Officer.   
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 Workers are also supposed to play a major role in the voluntary enforcement 
system, not only by working safely themselves, but by being given a voice in the internal 
responsibility system to participate in hazard identification and the development of firm-
level OHS policies and practices.  It is notable, however, that although in the early 
1980s the MOL sought to force worker concerns to be run through the IRS before it 
would act, that policy has long since been abandoned so that it is no longer the case 
that the MOL will only initiate enforcement activities after it has been demonstrated that 
the worker cannot resolve the matter directly with the employer. 
C. Reactive Enforcement 
As has been noted, beyond supporting voluntary compliance, reactive enforcement is 
the principle strategy for addressing ES violations. Moreover, reactive enforcement is 
generally limited to responding to the specific complaint of the employee.  Curiously, the 
MOL abandoned the strategy of treating a complaint as being good evidence of more 
systemic problems and launching a broader investigation of ES compliance at firms 
where employees were registering complaints.  This has had the result of eliminating a 
good risk-based technique for identifying areas where the investment of enforcement 
resources is likely to produce significant benefit to at-risk workers. In general, the 
inspection process follows a pyramid-based approach in which the majority of 
complaints are settled without further administrative action, with a decreasing number 
being resolved by the use of stronger enforcement measures, including orders and 
prosecutions for non-compliance.  
 In the area of OHS, more resources are invested in proactive enforcement than 
in reactive measures and this trend has been growing for some time.  Reactive 
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enforcement results in a range of measures being taken when violations are detected, 
from the provision of advice to issuing compliance orders, issuing stop work orders, 
provincial offence prosecutions and, rarely, criminal charges.  As in ES, there is an 
enforcement pyramid with the more serious sanctions being reserved for a smaller and 
smaller number of instances as the seriousness of the violation and resulting harms 
increases.   
D. Proactive Enforcement 
As noted above, OHS enforcement places a far greater emphasis on proactive 
measures than ES enforcement.  This is true notwithstanding that in response to an 
auditor general’s report in 2004 the ES branch increased the number of proactive 
inspections.  Both branches target proactive inspections using measures that identify 
areas where non-compliance is likely to be above the norm.  Proactive inspections in 
both areas result in a range of enforcement actions, from providing advice and 
encouragement at the bottom of the pyramid to issuance of compliance orders and 
tickets.  Interestingly, the pyramid of enforcement measures arising from a proactive ES 
inspection seems to be higher than in OHS inspections, which rarely go beyond orders 
and tickets.   
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V. Best Practices from Outside Ontario 
Thus far this report has demonstrated the limitations of Ontario’s ES and OHS 
enforcement regimes. The next step in developing appropriate policy recommendations 
involves considering practices outside Ontario. 
A.  Employment Standards Enforcement 
The overarching critique of the ES enforcement regime herein relates to its reactive 
emphasis with limited use of proactive measures as well as complementary ‘softer’ 
measures focusing on voluntary compliance through self-regulation.  Recall that 
proactive enforcement is an approach aimed at preventing violations, that is, in the first 
instance heavily reliant on inspections and expanded investigations when violations are 
detected.116 In turn, reactive enforcement is a strategy aimed at providing redress for 
workers dependent upon complaints to trigger regulatory intervention.  Finally, voluntary 
compliance is a strategy of self-regulation involving largely education and promotion in 
the first instance and negotiated settlements when complaints arise.117  
Despite this critique of the reactive focus of ES enforcement, it is important to 
acknowledge that almost all regulatory regimes use a mix of hard law, soft law (e.g., 
employer awareness programs and self-regulatory techniques), economic incentives, 
worker participation, etc. and that this will continue to be the reality.  The crucial 
question is how these strategies are best combined to improve the quality of 
enforcement (i.e., to maximize the effectiveness of investigations and inspections, 
penalties and settlements, and the voice118 of those affected): which ‘mixed’ models of 
enforcement have been found to be effective and which models have been found to be 
ineffective? Furthermore, what innovative community-based practices aimed at 
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improved enforcement exist outside Ontario, including those in which workers’ 
advocates and unions play an active role in documenting and redressing violations?   
This section addresses these questions by surveying the research literature and 
government reports covering best practices in ES in Australia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, as well as in other Canadian jurisdictions.119 It does so against the 
backdrop of problems identified with Ontario’s ES enforcement regime highlighted in 
earlier in this paper, in particular the four foremost concerns identified in the 2004 report 
of Ontario’s Auditor General (several of which were reiterated in its 2006 report): first, 
the limited number of proactive inspections undertaken by the Ministry despite its 
commitment to conduct them;120 second, the lack of extended investigations121 of 
substantiated claims to “cover other employees of the same employer to determine 
whether additional violations had taken place”122 ; third, the failure to prosecute many 
such repeat offending employers;123 and, fourth, the weaknesses in the collection of 
amounts in default owed to employee claimants by employers.124  
In identifying best practices, the analysis is also attentive to other limits of 
reactive ES enforcement regimes identified in the research literature pertinent to the 
Ontario case.  Such shortcomings encompass, in the area of investigations and 
inspections, the outmoded nature of ES enforcement regimes with respect to the growth 
of subcontracting, specifically, the dearth of measures to address the dynamics of 
supply chains, especially enforcement in small firms operating at the bottom of these 
chains,125 the infeasibility of achieving comprehensive coverage within a geographically-
focused inspectorate since it requires inspectors to cover an inordinate amount of 
ground,126, the relative inattention to high-risk industries,127 the lack of offices of a 
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workers’ advocate in most jurisdictions,128  and the limited interagency collaboration in 
sharing information pertinent to the detection of violations.129   In the area of penalties 
and settlements, deficiencies commonly identified include the tendency towards minimal 
penalties or sanctions; this shortcoming relates both to the relatively low level of 
settlements workers typically receive (i.e., settlements below those statutorily required 
as a consequence of  the mediation process) and, in the case of Ontario, as elsewhere, 
to the fact that employers “benefit from ‘voluntary compliance’ [of this sort] … because it 
keeps their violation off the enforcement track,” meaning that they are unlikely subjects 
of extended investigations in instances where they might occur, nor are they required to 
pay fines and administrative fees accompanying orders issued.130 Finally, in the area of 
voice, countless studies point to the failure to provide for third party involvement in the 
enforcement process in most contexts, that is, from complaints procedures to 
investigative activities and settlements processes.131 
 A range of best practices from other jurisdictions are noteworthy in responding to 
problems associated with a principally old style reactive regime.  Consistent with the 
goal of cultivating an effective ‘mixed model’, in what follows these best practices are 
divided by those that are proactive, reactive, and voluntary.  
1.  Proactive Practices 
The greatest number of promising initiatives for replication fall in the proactive grouping, 
most of which relate to investigations and inspections and to voice. Many such 
initiatives emanate from the United States, where a great deal of experimentation is 
taking place in the context of low rates of unionization, and Australia, a context in which 
workers have confronted decollectivization in the last few decades, partly via the 
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centralization of industrial relations, and the import of a North American style enterprise 
bargaining, cultivating greater reliance on ES as the main source of protection.  
 (i)  Investigations and Inspections 
With regard to investigations and inspections, a growing body of literature points 
to the importance of targeting high-risk industries and within these industries structures 
at the top.  Weil characterizes this strategy as critical to ‘strategic enforcement’ that 
applies four criteria to enforcement decisions – prioritization (i.e., choosing sectors 
carefully based on where intervention will have a high impact given factors such as the 
known level of violation and the vulnerability of the workers), deterrence (i.e., the threat 
of investigation), sustainability (i.e., the possibility of avoiding repeat offences), and 
system wide impacts – and he illustrates its effectiveness in several sectors 
characterized by large pyramidal structures (i.e., garment, fast food and hotels).132   
Responding partly to the impetus for change coming from Weil’s research 
findings, the Wages and Hours Division (WHD) of the U.S. Department of Labor began 
to embrace strategic enforcement in its activities under the Obama administration by 
ramping up inspections, increasing funding, and, most importantly, establishing a new 
plan/prevent/protect departmental  orientation which it describes as follows:  
“[b]ased on the principle that employers and others must “find and fix” violations 
– that is, assure compliance – before a DOL investigator arrives at the 
workplace.  Employers and others in the Department’s regulated communities 
must understand that the burden is on them to obey the law, not the DOL to 
catch them violating the law.  This principle is at the heart of this new DOL 
worker protection strategy. DOL is going to replace “catch me if you can” with 
Plan/Prevent/Protect.”133 
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Through this strategy, the DOL is targeting “fissured industries” in which “employment 
decisions have been devolved from major employers to a complex network of smaller 
employers... typically operat[ing] in more competitive markets,”134 specifically the 
hospitality, janitorial, construction, and agricultural sectors, for large enforcement 
sweeps as well as educative campaigns.   
For example, in 2011, the Department initiated an enforcement sweep focusing 
on the bottom of the fissured pyramid of production in the agricultural industry, 
beginning in South Florida and continuing up the Eastern Coast of the U.S., to increase 
compliance and inform workers of their rights under the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSAWPA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA), 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s Field Sanitation Standard.135  Under this 
initiative, by June,  it had conducted over 20 investigations, recovered $670,770 in back 
wages for approximately 600 agricultural workers, and assessed over $128,850 in 
penalties, finding violations such as “paying workers less than the federal minimum 
wage, and paying workers at packing sheds who did not qualify for the FLSA’s 
agricultural exemption ‘straight time’ for all hours worked, rather than time and one-half 
their regular rates of pay for overtime work hours as required.”136  This sweep involved 
sending teams of investigators to fields and packing houses to assess compliance by 
“facility owners, growers, farm labor contractors and all other business entities 
associated with these agricultural operations. Thorough inspections of transportation, 
field sanitation facilities, employment practices and pay records [were] conducted to 
ensure compliance with all applicable child labor and agricultural labor standards.”137  
Additionally, the Department undertook surveillance activities involving interviewing 
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workers at key sites, with numerous investigators covering large geographies on the 
same day and involving departmental lawyers early in preparing cases for future 
litigation.138   
On a smaller scale, there are jurisdictions in Canada beyond Ontario that report 
conducting proactive inspections. It is questionable as to whether they are of the calibre 
of best practices, as there is little evidence of either an industry or a geographic focus in 
any. For example, although they give complete discretion to the Director over the 
enforcement programs insofar as their implementation, Manitoba (S. 123 (1)) initiates 
proactive inspections against certain employers139 and New Brunswick (S. 58 (1)) 
conducts audits at random.140 Newfoundland and Labrador’s Labour Standards Act also 
includes powers of entry and inspection (S. 64) and engages in what it calls 
“preventative intervention,” where ESOs visit workplaces to meet informally with 
employers and employees to discuss their rights and responsibilities under provincial 
legislation141 These visits may be random or target certain employers or industries 
where non-compliance is evident. 
More innovative in their form, legislative measures introducing a ‘positive duty’ for 
employers to prevent illegal workplace practices are also emerging elsewhere.  At 
present, positive duty provisions are most developed in anti-discrimination law in 
contexts such as the United Kingdom.  However, scholars such as Linda Dickens argue 
that this notion could be used to improve ES enforcement.142 Taking such suggestions 
forward, positive duty provisions are also the main feature of the new model national 
OHS Bill scheduled to come into effect in Australia (in January 2012), and they require 
more out of employers in terms of due diligence in health and safety matters than in the 
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past; specifically, these preventative measures hold employers more rigorously 
accountable for preventing violations (i.e., for compliance).143 Notably, the Australian 
model law also has a wide definition of employers, which includes “officer[s]” of 
“person[s] conducting ...business[s] or undertaking[s],” encompassing a broader range 
of individuals exercising influence in shaping workplace terms and conditions – 
individuals in various locations in the sub-contracting chain, etc. – rather than an 
employer-employee relationship, narrowly defined.144  In its attempt to respond to 
fissures in employment structure and industries, this model national OHS Bill’s inclusion 
of a broad range of workplace actors in the model law constitutes an emerging best 
practice. 
Elements of yet another preventative measure operational in the U.S. are also 
pertinent to this survey as it covers a crucial high-risk industry in which subcontracting is 
central: namely, the ‘hot cargo’ (S. 15(a)) provision of the FSLA whereby the WHD uses 
the threat of embargoing goods manufactured in the garment sector below minimum 
ES. The hot cargo provision was underutilized in a period in which large inventories 
were common and shipments arrived infrequently.  With the arrival of just-in-time 
production, and its corollary (i.e., a growing pyramid of fissured production and the 
proliferation of small enterprises in this sector), the WHD revived it to pursue direct 
agreements with manufacturers after they have faced an embargo of their goods due to 
a violation of the FLSA at one of the subcontractors responsible for assembly work; 
manufacturers therefore enter into monitoring arrangements as a result of enforcement 
commenced by an investigator.  These arrangements cover a variety of practices 
including the provision of information, agreements to observe minimum standards, and 
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periodic compliance inspections and they cover all of the manufacturer’s clients, present 
and future.  Agreements also require manufacturers to take timely action to rectify 
violations on the part of its contractors both by ensuring that back wages are paid in 
cases where non-payment of wages are discovered and by notifying the WHD of such a 
finding.  Furthermore, they can be revoked at any time if the WHD finds the 
manufacturer to be in contravention.145 While the hot cargo provision has a voluntary 
cast, in that it leads to monitoring of small firms at the bottom of the contracting 
hierarchy by the manufacturers at the top (or the brand names) rather than state 
inspectors directly, it is proactive in the sense that it anticipates violations in high-risk 
sectors as well as recidivism.   In this way, its goals resemble measures undertaken 
elsewhere (e.g., in Australia) to protect garment workers that effectively treat them (e.g., 
via deeming) as employees of contractors and/or manufacturers for whom the directly 
produce goods and services.146  
Other best practices related to investigations respond to the call for collaboration 
between various agencies of government in the detection of violations. One concrete 
example of such collaboration is New York State’s Joint Enforcement Task Force on 
Employee Misclassification operating since 2007.147  This Taskforce was created in 
recognition of the fiscal burden that misclassified workers put on not only workers but 
the state (i.e., the revenue loss for the state and its agencies).  It involves 
representation from the state Departments of Labor and Taxation and Finance, the 
Workers’ Compensation Board, the Fraud Inspector General, the State Attorney 
General and the Comptroller of the City of New York, who proactively engage in 
enforcement sweeps, coordinated assignments, and systematic referrals and data 
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sharing to recover lost wages and government revenue.  As a result of its efforts, 
between 2007 and 2010, the Taskforce identified “50,000 instances of employee 
misclassification and discovered over $704 million in unreported wages” leading to the 
assessment of “$21.5 million in unemployment taxes and over $1.85 million in 
unemployment insurance fraud penalties, over $16.5 million in unpaid wages, and over 
$2.3 million in workers compensation fines and penalties”. 148  Initially, joint enforcement 
sweeps revealing that the construction industry was fraught with violations resulted in a 
noteworthy initiative: a new law, known as the New York State Construction Industry 
Fair Play Act, which took effect in Fall 2010. The legislation is designed to curb 
misclassification by creating a presumption of employment in the construction industry 
unless an employer can meet a three factor test.149 The law also provides new penalties 
for employers who fail to classify their employees properly (Fair Play Act s. 861(e)).150 
 (ii)  Voice 
With respect to the ability of workers’ and their organizations to shape enforcement 
processes and thus exercise control over their conditions of employment, or their voice, 
a number of innovative community-based practices aimed at improved enforcement 
also exist in which workers’ advocates and unions are involved in documenting and 
redressing violations. Some such initiatives are institutionalized, such as the Los 
Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and Board of Public Workers Deputization 
Programs (LABPW), documented by Fine and Gordon.151 Under the first program, the 
LAUSD deputizes and trains business representatives of building trades unions to 
enforce the prevailing wage on district projects funded by monies from construction 
bonds.  These representatives are known as “work preservation volunteers”, are 
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provided with badges and business cards, and are authorized to enter school sites to 
conduct what are effectively compliance visits. The program emanated from a 
controversial agreement in which construction unions conceded their right to strike over 
job issues in exchange for the creation of an internal compliance department set up by 
the LAUSD in which union representatives play this role.  With its establishment, the 
LABPW followed suit, training what it calls compliance group representatives. Both 
programs are designed to make these on-the-ground inspectors the representatives of 
labour inspectors from the City and thereby expand their enforcement capacity, as is the 
case with the hot cargo provision of the FSLA.  Agents’ duties thus include interviewing 
employees about hours, wages, job classification, official duties, and problems at work 
more generally. They also assist workers in filling out forms in the complaint process 
(i.e., when the perceive violations through their investigatory efforts); but they do not 
determine violations or assess penalties.  Both well established programs, 
representatives are retrained every year.  They are also informed regularly that they are 
not permitted to use their activities to gather information for their unions, disparage non-
union contractors, or review project data outside a pending complaint. 
These examples represent the strongest version of Fine and Gordon’s152 call for 
community based enforcement (i.e., enabling civil society groups to deliver information 
and education, patrol communities, file and investigate complaints, and provide for 
ongoing deterrents), which has its roots in a failed provision of the FLSA. Specifically, 
when the FLSA was being drafted, there was an attempt to secure a fair labour 
standards board to work with enlightened employers and unions to help police 
sweatshop employment relationships; but the provision never materialized. Instead, a 
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weak judicial body emerged and the U.S. Congress effectively banned unions from 
bringing class actions under the FLSA.153   Like this failed vision for the fair labour 
standards board, as these authors assert, the strength of such programs include their 
relative permanence and that they are enshrined in public law rather than operating as a 
program of a particular administration. Although it is difficult to assess their impact on 
the nature and degree of violations of ES, these programs also follow Weil’s154 
prescription for regulatory jujitsu as their substantive success flows from the business 
representatives’ intimate understanding of sector-based issues, the “contour” of their 
activities to specific rules applicable to public construction, and their access to detailed 
data. 
 Although it is less institutionalized, another example of community based 
enforcement where workers gain voice is the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund 
(MCTF), a janitorial watchdog involving a California local of the SEIU (Local 1877) and 
lead contractors engaged in collective agreements with that local. Together, these 
institutions established a trust fund whose mission is to abolish unfair business 
practices in this industry through education as well as investigating cleaning contractors 
conditions to enhance enforcement by public agencies and private attorneys.155  
Signatory contractors pay between 1 and 5 cents per hour worked by workers to fund 
such programs, which require a staff of seven to cover the California area.  This staff 
exposes, persuades, and will ultimately sue violators if they refuse to change. It also 
helps state agencies with fact finding, brings workers to agencies to follow up, and also 
supports workers engaged in private litigation.  As part of its activities, the MCTF enters 
monitoring agreements with troublesome contractors and helps cultivate interagency 
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monitoring.156  The main limitations of its activities, compared to the preceding 
examples, are twofold: first, firms can always choose alternative contractors whereas 
more traditional justice for janitors campaigns target worksites, and thus building 
tenants must comply with monitoring agreements rather than firms.  Second, the MCTF 
is not capable of making lasting change inside state agencies. 
Still another example of this community based enforcement holds the promise of 
responding to this criticism: the New York Wage and Hours Watch, a relatively new 
formal partnership between New York’s labour department and six agencies including 
workers’ centres and unions. This arrangement involves a memorandum of agreement 
signed in 2009 in which the participating organizations agree to identify and train at 
least six people to serve as wage and hour watch members for two years. In this 
capacity, these individuals, who are not deputized, provide at least 200 businesses per 
year with labour-law compliance information and hold sessions for the public and refer 
potential labour law violations to the labour department but they are not authorised to 
carry out inspections; they essentially function like “neighbourhood watch” applied to 
labour standards such that the chief strength of the model they follow is the ongoing 
partnerships between the state enforcement bureaucracy and community groups. As 
Fine and Gordon157  suggest, to be effective, however, such collaborations must have 
clear terms of reference regarding the scope of decision-making, funding to enable 
community participation, and retain a strong enforcement role for the state.158 
2. Reactive Approaches 
As elsewhere in the United States, Australia, the UK, and other jurisdictions in Canada, 
Ontario’s ES enforcement system is designed such that there will always been 
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individual complaints. Permitting, and even encouraging, complaints from individual 
workers is acceptable in accordance with the starting principles of decent work, 
fairness, access to social minima and universality so long as both a better balance is 
achieved between reactive and proactive approaches and resources dedicated to 
complaints procedures are used wisely.  For example, the MOL’s goal of eliminating the 
backlog in unresolved claims described in Section II is laudable.  However, a 
quantitative approach to achieving this goal by seeking expedited settlements below 
legislated minima is out of step with the justice principle, that is, the quality of 
settlements, defined in terms of appropriate levels of penalties and effective collections 
for individual violators and more broadly in terms of Weil’s strategic enforcement pillars 
of deterrence and prioritization (i.e., individual investigations should aim to be high 
impact in their effects).  
 (i) Investigations and Inspections 
In recognition of the fact that, in Tucker’s159 helpful characterization, “most workers are 
unlikely to be assertive protagonists” – i.e., it is unreasonable to depend on workers as 
whistleblowers, particularly in the context of high levels of precariousness in labour 
markets such as Ontario, as documented in another report prepared for this initiative160 
– permitting anonymous complaints is a best practice reactive approach in the area of 
investigations and inspections. Such is the case in Saskatchewan where the MOL offers 
a complaint option that allows employees to anonymously submit complaints and 
evidence against an employer who the Compliance and Review Unit then investigates. 
This option is available if the worker is still “employed at [the] workplace; believes that 
the Labour Standards Act is not being followed and would like the situation to be 
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corrected but does not: but, does not want to file a formal complaint.” Under such 
circumstances, only written complaints with supporting evidence are reviewed.  The 
Compliance and Review Unit also pursues expanded investigations in many such 
instances; specifically,where a claim submitted by a worker is found to apply to more 
than one worker at the worksite, the Ministry will expand their inspection to protect all 
workers present.161  Anonymous complaints are also accepted in six labor agencies in 
the United States; Colorado, New Jersey, California, Connecticut, Illinois, and New 
York.162  
 (ii) Penalties and Settlements 
With respect to penalties and settlements, two best practices from the U.S. are 
instructive. The first is found in the State of California, where a section of the Labour 
Code, colloquially known as the “brother’s keeper” law holds user firms in certain low 
wage industries responsible for subcontractors wage and hours violations under a duty 
based regime.163 This law provides that “a person or entity may not enter into a contract 
or agreement for labor or services with a construction, farm labor, garment, janitorial, or 
security guard contractor, where the person or entity knows or should know that the 
contract or agreement does not include funds sufficient to allow the contractor to comply 
with all the applicable, local state, and federal laws or regulations governing the labor or 
services.”164  In other words, if a contracting firm is negligent by failing to uncover and 
limit employment law violations apparent from its contractual arrangements with labour 
suppliers, it can be held responsible.165  Resembling the hot cargo provision of the 
FLSA, but applicable to a greater number of industries, the aim of the law is to deter 
purchasers from entering into labour supply arrangements that are, by their financial 
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terms, likely to lead to labour standards violations and more specifically to encourage 
manufacturers to have contractors put agreements in writing.166  In such ways, this law 
could be characterized as a proactively-oriented reactive measure as it attempts to 
prevent violations from occurring, distinguishing it from provisions the limited for joint 
and several liability in Ontario’s ESA, which are more genuinely reactive (e.g., those 
applied to temporary help agencies and their clients).167 However, since the brother’s 
keeper law’s teeth only come into play after violations have occurred and have been 
revealed and since it does not necessitate monitoring agreements of the sort mandated 
by the WHD under the hot cargo provision, it falls in the reactive category.168   
Spreading across the United States in the last few years, a second area of best 
practices encompasses Wage Theft Bills, a cluster of policies designed to enforce 
minimum wage, overtime and other wage related labour standards where cities and 
states play a central role in “scaling up” struggles for improved enforcement.169  This 
strategy emerged principally through community campaigns responding to the fact that 
over a dozen U.S. states had minimum wage and overtime protections superior to 
federal law.  They then gradually came to involve counties and states, via the creation 
of Wage Theft Laws, in the prosecution of wage violations, including, among other 
things, the collection of extensive damages on behalf of workers, charging employers 
that violate the law the full cost of administrative proceedings, and revoking the 
operating licenses of known violators. One success story is found in the county of 
Miami-Dade, Florida which passed the first county wide ordinance in the U.S.  Adopted 
in February 2010, this ordinance outlaws wage theft and provides the county with the 
ability to intervene in the recovery of back wages for workers who have experienced 
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violations.170  Specifically, it provides for triple damages to be paid to workers and 
requires the violator to pay the administrative costs of claims, as well as damages.  In 
this way, it responds to the concern that mediated settlements are inadequate by 
bolstering the level of back wages awarded, puts more pressure on collections, and 
removes the frequent requirement on workers and their representatives for covering 
administrative fees in the complaints process. Although the system of regulation differs 
in Canada, where only approximately ten per cent of the workforce is covered by the 
federal labour code and where ES in the area of wages vary province, the use of levers 
at the local level to improve enforcement in this U.S. case is the key lesson.  
(iii) Voice 
In the arena of voice, under Australia’s Fair Work Act (2008), which sets out ten new 
national ES, unions have the right to bring court proceedings in relation to violations of 
ES if they are entitled to represent the employee in question.171   If the violation relates 
to a workplace agreement (akin to a collective agreement Canadian-style) or workplace 
determination that binds the union, the union can also make an application in its own 
right, on behalf of an employee, or both.172 This limited space for unions amounts to a 
degree of third party involvement in the enforcement process.  It should be emphasized, 
however, that this example only represents an improvement when compared to the 
system operating under Australia’s former ‘Work Choices’ regime since union rights 
under the new centralized system of industrial relations remain more constrained than 
two decades ago when they were considerably stronger in most states. 
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3. Voluntary Approaches 
The research literature, including studies on OHS and ES, documents the limits of 
voluntary measures, especially when they are the exclusive means of enforcement.173 It 
highlights the need to begin with the acknowledgment of the inherent power imbalance 
between workers and employers and the related recognition that this imbalance is 
amplified with globalization and the fissuring of production processes,174  especially the 
growth of subcontracting etc. not only in the private but the public sector. Considered on 
its own terms, there are nevertheless several best practices in voluntary compliance, 
which essentially amounts to the implementation of regimes of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (encompassing, among other examples, social labelling – or 
verification systems for a firm’s social performance by authorizing the use of a physical 
label to communicate the social conditions surrounding production – and codes of 
conduct – a written set of standards, principles and norms to which a firm conforms)175 
that could potentially complement innovative proactive and reactive strategies in the 
context of a proactively-oriented mixed regime.176  These practices relate principally to 
investigations and inspections. 
 (i) Investigations and Inspections 
Considering concrete best practices in voluntarism (narrowly defined), with regard to 
investigations and inspections, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) is one model applied 
globally in which brand names commit themselves to a regime of private monitoring. 
Specifically, these entities, including their entire chain of suppliers, agree to a 
programme of implementing a code of conduct, internal monitoring, and unannounced 
independent external monitoring of standards.  The model emerged in response to the 
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fact that the traditional CRS measures concentrating on auditing fail to address the root 
causes of non-compliance; in response, it integrates a system of monitoring, 
rectification and third party complaints. The FLA was formed in 1999 and involves 
sixteen brand names and is administered by a coalition of benevolent firms, university 
groups, and NGOs from around the world.  It covers 4,000 facilities in eighty countries. 
The names covered by the model thus implement the FLA principles which are 
equivalent to the core labour standards of the ILO, conduct internal monitoring, submit 
to third party audits by FLA accredited auditors in a random sample of 5 percent of their 
suppliers as well as to publishing the results of these audits on the FLA website after 
the company has the opportunity to take remedial action, and report to the public on 
various activities.177 
A distinctive best practice in voluntary compliance oriented to the public rather 
than the private sector, and of growing popularity among unions, union centrals, 
employers and states,178  is public procurement policy – agreements that government 
agencies investing “tax dollars” make with private sector actors in procuring public 
works projects.  Such agreements exist in a range of contexts and at different scales, 
including in Toronto, whose policy is longstanding. A noteworthy national example is 
Ireland’s Public Sector Procurement Policy, which seeks to “maintain employment 
standards in the public sector and uphold statutory norms, notably in relation to 
construction companies tendering for and engaging in public work contracts.”179 This 
new agreement calls for adhering to “industry norms in terms of pay and conditions and 
to prevailing national and/or industry-wide agreements, including health and safety 
regulations,” as well as to “employment standards and statutory norms, including those 
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regarding wage levels, while also ensuring competitive tendering and value for 
money.”180  It is administered by the Department of Finance, which issues public 
procurement guidelines, and is promoted by a range of other government agencies, 
including local government and transport agencies. Under its terms, contracting 
authorities are also to facilitate access to the Labour Relations Commission Conciliation 
Service, Labour Court and the Rights Commissioner Service (e.g., in the event of an 
industrial dispute) in line with Ireland’s industrial relations regime181   
Another national example is the umbrella group known as the Sweatfree 
Purchasing Consortium, a group of state and local governments in the U.S. who help 
other cities, states, counties, towns, and school districts to develop and implement 
policies and rules towards the goal of avoiding sweatshop products.  The Consortium 
works to assist governments in creating codes of conduct, applicable to the contracts in 
which they engage, requiring that their contractors, abide by “standards that enjoy 
international consensus and the will of the people of the nation and region of 
production,” specifically, the core conventions of the ILO and its Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its implementation and monitoring.182  
The Consortium also provides guidelines for a five step program for the monitoring of 
such Codes involving: advertising (i.e., public entities are to conduct “targeted 
advertising campaign[s] to declare their intent to allocate public funds to purchase 
goods and services that are produced in safe, fair and humane working conditions;”183  
prequalification, which involves requiring or encouraging vendors to agree, in advance 
of making a bid, to conform to the public entity’s code of conduct; a process equivalent 
to certification, which involves requiring bidders that have not fulfilled the 
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prequalification requirement to attest through various means  that they will subscribe to 
the code of conduct in question (e.g., documentation may be required to prove that 
suppliers related to the bidder are required by the bidder to conform to the Code); 
supplier evaluation, a process in which the advisory team to the Code verifies the 
vendors’ capacities to comply with its terms (i.e., before an award is made); and, 
performance monitoring, which entails setting out “specific steps to ensure code 
compliance and responsible supply chain management throughout the duration of the 
contract as a condition for contract continuation and/or renewal.”184  
 Still other vehicles of voluntary compliance involve more focussed partnerships 
between state agencies and industry. One example is the Horticultural Industry Shared 
Compliance Program, involving the Australia’s Fair Work Ombudsman, horticultural 
industry employers and state agencies in a large-scale attempt to remedy the high level 
of violations in this sector.185 This program adheres to a three stage program of 
activities, which includes, first, developing a joint publication operating as an employer 
guide to the Horticultural Award; second, planning for compliance, specifically 
circulating educational resources to and hosting seminars for employers about 
employment regulations for the purposes of self-audits and informing them of audit 
phases of the program; and, third, auditing a randomly selected group of employers 
towards a nationwide audit. This program is, however, highly voluntary since, at the 
third stage, even when violations were found, the Fair Work Inspectors work with 
employers to encourage voluntary compliance rather than pursuing prosecutions.186  
Another example, also operating in Australia, is the “Proactive Compliance Deed” 
between McDonald’s Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia.”187  In this 
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agreement, which is technically between Fair Work Australia, the federal body 
responsible for the enforcement of ES, and McDonald’s, the latter agrees to follow a 
national self-audit program to ensure that it is complying with relevant labour laws, 
especially those related to wage payments.  This self-audit covers ten per cent of all 
employees at twenty-seven McDonald’s restaurants and it requires the company to 
disclose and rectify each contravention found.   
Based on these types of examples and their successes and failures, other 
researchers also call for ‘softer’ techniques of investigation and inspection to 
supplement ‘hard laws’, particularly in what Teague refers to as “Anglo-Saxon” contexts. 
These techniques include diagnostic monitoring, which uses inspection as a 
comprehensive review of arrangements and a means of examining reasons beyond 
non-compliance without the threat of rectification off the bat, and specialized institutions 
(for example, the UK’s Low Pay Commission) designed to educate the public on 
employment regulations.188 For such authors, integrating these arrangements into 
labour codes offers the potential of broadening enforcement beyond single agencies, 
and hence a more holistic approach that could be combined effectively with proactive 
measures in contexts like Ireland, where the principle of rectification is relatively 
unsuccessful in addressing the standard setting behaviour of forms. Such techniques 
could be combined with existing strategies of naming violators on government websites 
to improve compliance over the long term, as is common in several jurisdictions in 
Canada, including Ontario.189 Yet the power of voluntary measures, even those ‘best 
practices’, is not compelling, unless they are combined with harder and more proactive 
measures of enforcement. 
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B. OHS Enforcement 
Building on the framework for discussion of best practices in ES, this section addresses 
best practices in OHS enforcement through the lenses of proactive approaches, 
reactive approaches, and voluntary approaches.  Clearly, there are very substantial 
differences between the ES and the OHS enforcement regimes, not just in Ontario but 
in most of the industrialized world.  Proactive enforcement and worker voice are much 
better institutionalized in the OHS regime than they are in ES, as are voluntary 
approaches.  One reason for this is that a vibrant worker OHS movement in the 1970s 
and 1980s was able to pressure governments and employers to address OHS issues 
much more aggressively and proactively than they had in the past, and to accord 
workers and their unions a voice both at the policy and the workplace levels.  Therefore, 
the discussion of best practices in OHS begins from a different baseline than in ES. 
1. Proactive Enforcement 
 (i)Inspections 
There is widespread agreement on the principle of risk-based regulation.  This requires 
regulators to allocate their enforcement resources on the basis of an assessment of the 
risks that a firm or a sector (however defined) pose to the regulator’s objectives.190 In 
the context of OHS regulation, where the overall objective is to prevent occupational 
deaths, injuries and diseases, an assessment must be made of the inherent risks posed 
by an activity and the competence and commitment of firms to mitigate those risks.191  
The strategic enforcement model developed by Weil192 described earlier operates 
according to similar principles. 
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 The importance of proactive inspection as a best practice cannot be understated 
and, as evident in Section III, the OHSD has emphasized this dimension of its 
enforcement activities in recent years.  As well, the OHSD has gone some way toward 
the adoption of best practices in setting priorities for its proactive enforcement program, 
by taking into account injury rates and claims cost, compliance history, inherent 
hazards, new businesses, size and the presence of new and/or vulnerable workers.  A 
strong word of caution, however, should be registered about the use of workers’ 
compensation data in setting priorities.  Numerous studies have shown that the use of 
claims cost data to experience rate firms in workers’ compensation produces strong 
incentives for employers to engage in aggressive claims management that may alter the 
claims data without addressing the underlying OHS conditions that result in work 
injuries193   As a result, workers’ compensation data is an unreliable indicator of the 
capacity and commitment of firms to manage their health and safety and the data is 
likely to become even less reliable to the extent that it becomes known that it is used for 
targeting enforcement resources.  It is notable that the Dean Report has called for the 
development of a common database to measure leading rather than lagging indicators 
for the purpose of assessing risk and measuring performance.194  The development of 
such a database would provide a much firmer foundation for establishing proactive 
inspection priorities. 
 The use of safety blitzes or targeted safety campaigns has also been identified 
as a best practice for risk-based regulation and has been used in Sweden, Australia, the 
UK and Quebec195  and, as noted above, is being used in Ontario. The literature also 
suggests that there needs to be a linkage between the results of a safety blitz inspection 
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and subsequent proactive enforcement activities.  In particular, where a safety blitz 
inspection or, for that matter, a regular proactive inspection detects a violation, the 
result should not just be an order to address the particular problem, rather the finding 
should trigger a broader review of the employer’s management system to understand 
how and why the violation occurred and was not corrected prior to the inspection and to 
take steps for this to be corrected.  This “bottom-up” approach196 avoids isolating 
particular problems or incidents from the bigger picture, as well as from higher levels of 
management who need to be made to understand that it is their responsibility to institute 
good OHS management practices in the firm.  It is not clear from the documentation 
whether Ontario follows this best practice. 
 This raises a larger question about the conduct of inspections and the actions 
taken when OHS problems are identified.  As noted in section III, there has been a shift 
from compliance assistance to enforcement.  The Dean Report197 noted this shift and 
heard differing views from stakeholders on its merits.  Not surprisingly, employers 
expressed some concern about the shift and wanted more compliance assistance, while 
labour wanted more consistent enforcement in certain areas of non-compliance, 
including training and JHSC requirement. The Dean Report recommendation split the 
difference, calling for consistent enforcement of serious and wilful contraventions and 
compliance assistance where it would help achieve compliance.198 
 The next section on reactive enforcement returns to consider, in more detail, the 
use of Part III prosecutions.  For the purposes of the present discussion, it is noteworthy 
that such prosecutions almost never result from a proactive inspection.  Rather, they are 
launched only when a violation has resulted in a serious injury or a fatality.  
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Enforcement action taken in response to proactive inspections, therefore, range from 
the provision of advice, to formal orders to Part I tickets for which there are set fines, 
currently no greater than $295.00.   
 There is no overriding consensus on the best practice in regard to balancing 
between prosecution and compliance beyond the nostrum that neither a pure 
compliance nor a pure prosecution model is desirable.199  However, Richard Johnstone 
has raised serious questions about the appropriateness of limiting prosecutions to 
instances where violations have materialized in substantial harm as these outcomes 
may be unrelated to the degree of culpability of the duty holder.200  Rather, a more 
appropriate approach to prosecutions would take into account the extent to which the 
employer departed from regulatory requirements, the degree of risk posed by the non-
compliance and the employer’s track record.  Using that metric, a best practice would 
result in prosecutions arising from proactive inspections in appropriate circumstances.  
 With regard to tickets, there have been few empirical studies of their effects, but 
a review of those studies and the practice of ticketing (infringement notices) in Australia 
supported the view they have a role to play in getting the message across and spurring 
preventive OHS activity.201 However, concerns have been raised by Garry Gray about 
the way ticketing is used in Ontario, particularly because in his study workers were the 
target of 37 percent of the tickets, supervisors 38 percent and employers 25 percent.  In 
particular, Gray noted that supervisors were far more likely to be charged with failure to 
ensure safety than were employers.202 The result is to allow responsibility for 
compliance to be pushed down into the lowest reaches of the firm’s managerial 
hierarchy rather than treating these violations as failure of the employer’s OHS 
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management system that needs to be corrected at a senior management level. The 
need for a bottom-up approach, discussed earlier, should be adopted as a best practice 
in regard to ticketing. 
 A fundamental problem facing enforcers of all forms of labour market regulation 
is the fissuring of the employment relationship.203  This entails the fragmentation of 
previously integrated systems of production, entailing contracting out of work to smaller 
firms and the use of contingent workers in the form of temporary employees, temporary 
agency workers, and self-employed workers.  To the extent that disintegration strategies 
still involve having contingent workers perform work on an employer’s site, the employer 
retains responsibility for their health and safety and inspectors who visit the site have 
the opportunity to observe whether these arrangements are creating observable OHS 
risks.  They may not, however, be aware that disintegration strategies that may in 
themselves undermine good OHS management are being undertaken.  For example, 
they may not know that some of the workers are employees of the inspected employer 
while others are agency workers sent for a temporary work assignment.  In that regard, 
it is unclear how well the targeting criteria will detect firms where contingent workers are 
present onsite.  While the MOL does take into account the presence of vulnerable 
workers, the term does not seem to be defined and this factor may be offset by an 
artificially low claims and cost experience due to the fact that temporary agencies will be 
charged for agency workers, and that self-employed workers may not have workers’ 
compensation coverage or will have coverage in their own names.  
 The problems for inspection produced by workplace fissuring become even more 
difficult when the work is not performed on the employer’s premises but at another site.  
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This is because fragmentation and the expansion of supply chains are associated with 
an increase in small and medium-sized workplaces.  Not only does this create more 
workplaces for inspectors to visit, but there is ample evidence that the health and safety 
performance of these workplaces is likely to be lower than in larger, more integrated 
enterprises and are “relatively impervious to the regular tools of the trade for assessing 
risk, providing service and designing interventions.204 Reasons for this include the lower 
likelihood that small workplaces will be unionized and provide a channel for worker 
voice, and the fact that small business are often lacking in management resources, 
knowledge, skill and time.  As a result, not only are there more firms to regulate, but 
their regulation is more resource intensive. Although the MOL does take into account 
firm size as a criterion for targeting proactive inspections, in the absence of a 
corresponding growth in inspection resources the likelihood of a firm that fits the 
targeting criteria being inspected is likely to decrease.  Therefore, a best practice, albeit 
one that no jurisdiction has realized, is to link the budget for inspection not only to the 
size of the labour force but also to some measure of the level of workplace 
fragmentation.  Further work would be required to devise such a measure. 
 Because of the scale of the problem of regulating proliferating and lengthening 
supply chains and production networks, researchers have suggested that “upstream” 
approaches need to be emphasized, meaning that interventions should be designed to 
focus on the contextual and institutional factors that shape risk creation.205 A prominent 
example of this approach is supply chain regulation which in various forms seeks to 
place responsibility for downstream businesses on the upstream firms that contract with 
! +* 
them, thereby improving downstream OHS performance and compliance while reducing 
the demand downstream for inspection and enforcement resources. 
 Phil James et al examine several options for supply chain regulation to improve 
OHS.206  The report shall return to voluntary approaches later.  Here, the focus is 
regulatory initiatives.  The first approach centres on the use of the government’s 
contracting power.  The principle is derived from fair wage resolutions, which are also a 
common Canadian practice, that require companies doing business with government to 
pay wages no less favourable than those provided in prevailing collective agreements.  
An analogous mechanism is the federal contractor’s program under the Employment 
Equity Act that requires contractors to commit to implement employment equity and to 
establish employment equity programs that meet specified requirements and are 
subject to compliance reviews.  Although these programs are not costless in terms of 
monitoring costs, and indeed have been criticized because of the lack of resources 
devoted to compliance review,207 they do potentially provide a cost efficient way of 
improving labour standards and compliance, especially where the consequence of non-
compliance is loss of the ability to contract with the government.  This approach could 
be adapted to require government contractors to commit to implement specified OHS 
management practices and to assume responsibility for the OHS practices of the firms 
with whom they may subcontract.  An example of this approach is the Construction 
(Design and Management) Regulations in the UK.  However, to be effective, best 
practices would require that adequate resources need to be devoted to compliance. 
 The second approach aims at the private sector.  One example cited by James et 
al. that has already been canvassed in the discussion of ES is the “hot cargo” provision 
! ++ 
of the FLSA in the US.208  In principle, the threat that goods that are manufactured in 
violation of the OHSA will be prevented from entering into commerce could be used to 
leverage agreements from upstream companies to monitor their subcontractors’ OHS 
performance and regulatory compliance.  Another example provided is from Australia in 
relation to long distance truck drivers and fatigue.  Not only are employers required to 
assess the risk of fatigue and take steps to reduce that risk, but it also extends this 
requirement to their contracts with self-employed carriers and imposes an obligation on 
freight consignors and consignees to monitor head carriers’ compliance with their legal 
obligations and prohibits them from entering into contracts with carriers unless they 
have satisfied themselves on reasonable grounds that delivery times and work 
arrangements will comply with the driver fatigue management plan.   
 To this point, it does not appear that Ontario has taken steps to develop any form 
supply chain regulation of OHS.  This best practice should be a priority.209 
(ii) Voice 
Unlike ES enforcement, OHS regulation provides institutionalized mechanisms for 
employee voice through the requirement for joint health and safety committees (JHSC) 
in workplaces with twenty or more workers and for worker health and safety 
representatives (HSR) in workplaces where the number of workers regularly exceeds 
five.  One of the main purposes of JHSCs and HSRs is to identify workplace hazards.  A 
comprehensive description of the operation and powers of JHSCs, worker JHSC 
members and HSRs is beyond the scope of this review.  What follows is a basic 
overview of the mechanisms for enabling workers’ voices to be part of a proactive 
process for managing OHS risks.   
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 JHSC members and HSRs must receive training, are entitled to obtain 
information from the employer, and most importantly here, conduct health and safety 
inspections of the workplace no less than once a month.  Time spent carrying out these 
duties is deemed to be work time for which representatives are to be paid. The 
employer must respond to written recommendations within twenty-one days and shall 
either provide a timetable for implementing the recommendation or reasons why the 
employer does not accept the recommendation. There is no formal dispute resolution 
mechanism provided in the act, but if the worker representative believes that the 
recommendation is to correct a violation of the act, he or she can complain to the OHSD 
and that would trigger a reactive inspection.  As well, if a certified member210 believes 
that there is a contravention of the act that poses a danger or hazard to a worker and 
that a delay in controlling the hazard may seriously impose a danger to a worker, the 
member may initiate a procedure leading to a stop work order by the two certified 
members.  Certified worker members of JHSC do not have the unilateral power to order 
that work be stopped, unless the Ontario Labour Relations Board has made an order 
permitting it.  To our knowledge, no such order has ever been issued.    Worker 
representatives also have the power to investigate work refusals and investigate serious 
accidents.  Finally, a worker JHSC member, HSR or other knowledgeable worker is also 
entitled to accompany the inspector.  
 Workers can also have a direct voice other than through JHSC members or 
HSRs.  Workers can complain to the OHSD about OHS violations and most workers 
can refuse unsafe work where they have reasonable grounds to believe conditions in 
the workplace, including the threat of workplace violence, is likely to pose a danger to 
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herself or himself, or to another worker.  This initiates an internal inspection and if the 
worker is not satisfied with the result of that inspection the OHSD inspector is called, 
triggering a reactive inspection to determine whether the circumstance that led to the 
refusal is likely to harm the worker or another person. 
 As the above summary indicates, worker voice is institutionalized and enables 
workers to be eyes and ears on the shop floor identifying hazards and initiating actions 
to have them remedied.  International literature confirms that worker participation is a 
best practice in OHS regulation.211  However, the literature also emphasizes that it is not 
enough to simply mandate worker voice. Rather, the effectiveness of worker voice 
varies depending on the presence or absence of a number of supports, including union 
representation, legislated support, worker training, active workplace inspectorates and 
an activist orientation by worker representatives.212  While Ontario continues to 
legislatively support worker voice, most recently evidenced in Bill 160’s addition of a 
requirement for HSR training and a power for a single co-chair of a JHSC to make 
written recommendations to an employer, the decline in union representation and the 
proliferation of small workplaces are undermining the effectiveness of worker voice.213 
As a result, worker protagonism is jeopardized, notwithstanding that the OHSA prohibits 
retaliation against a worker for exercising her or his rights under the act. 
 Indeed, the problem of retaliation against workers was raised before the Dean 
inquiry. In its report, it called for improved protection from reprisals to encourage 
workers to exercise their rights under the act, especially as other measures that it 
advocated, such as increasing worker training and awareness, would likely result in 
more workers raising OHS concerns.214  Bill 160 responded by enabling inspectors to 
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refer a worker reprisal complaint directly to the Ontario Labour Relations Board, which 
adjudicates the complaint. 
 Such measures are helpful, but are unlikely to provide most workers generally 
and precarious workers in particular with the security they need to feel comfortable 
exercising their OHSA rights.   Although there are no panaceas to compensate for 
changing structural conditions that undermine worker voice, the Swedish experience 
with regional health and safety representatives is a model that could be adopted to 
extend the reach of worker voice and increase the surveillance capacity of the 
inspectorate to smaller, hard to reach workplaces. Under Swedish law, trade unions 
have the right to appoint regional safety representatives for all small firms in which they 
have a member and in which there is no JHSC.  According to Kaj Frick regional HSRs 
“mainly function as peripatetic ‘local’ representatives, who help to detect OHS hazards 
and discuss with managers how to abate them.”215  Lacking formal enforcement powers 
(except in the face of imminent dangers), their effectiveness in large measure derives 
from their superior knowledge and broad experience in addressing OHS issues.  
Despite the erosion of the conditions in Sweden that supported the role of regional 
health and safety representatives, they still make an important contribution to OHS 
management in small firms.   
 In an environment in which union representation is declining and in which 
employer resistance to the presence of outside union-appointed HSRs is likely to be 
great, an alternative would be to seek out other intermediaries who are knowledgeable 
about health and safety to play this supporting role. Use of community partners might 
not be appropriate unless they have the requisite knowledge to be effective advisors 
! ,% 
and monitors.  Perhaps a governmental office, similar to the Office of the Worker 
Advisor in workers’ compensation might be considered, or non-governmental groups, 
like the Workers Health and Safety Legal Clinic or the Occupational Health Clinics for 
Ontario Workers could be funded and given a larger mandate to provide these services. 
 2 Reactive Approaches 
Reactive inspection and enforcement occurs when there is a complaint about a 
violation, a work refusal or a serious injury or fatality that is required to be reported to 
the OHSD.  There is no need here to go into the limits of a reactive strategy, except to 
reiterate that the willingness to complain or to exercise the right to refuse is shaped by 
many factors in addition to the hazards present in the workplace.216  This is especially 
true for precarious workers whose vulnerability makes them even less likely to make 
formal complaints. Similarly, the occurrence of a serious injury or fatality may or may not 
be indicative of a larger problem that requires intervention beyond dealing with the 
particular circumstances that caused the mishap.  For these reasons, the OHSD has 
justifiably put more resources into proactive approaches.  
However, when reactive inspections and enforcement actions are taken, it is 
important that they are effective and so this issue is critical to address. Examining 
reactive inspections in response to work refusals and retaliation complaints revealed 
that the mandate of the inspector is to determine whether or not there is a health and 
safety violation, not to determine whether a worker has suffered retaliation for enforcing 
his or her rights, which is to be determined either through arbitration, where a workplace 
is unionized, or through a complaint, and now an inspector referral, to the OLRB.  This 
arrangement is reasonable. The question addressed here is whether further 
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enforcement action should be taken in these circumstances.  Here it is also to be noted 
that retaliation is also a violation of the OHSA for which an employer could be 
prosecuted.  However, this is not a practice that has been adopted.  The Dean Report 
called for a review of the MOL’s policy in this regard and recommended that “enhanced 
enforcement” should be undertaken to address egregious or repeated violations of 
section 50 (the no-retaliation provision).217  This recommendation should be 
implemented.  As well, consistent with the previous discussions of a bottom-up 
enforcement strategy, a finding that there has been retaliation should trigger a follow up 
inspection to insure that senior management has taken appropriate measures to insure 
that everyone in the organization understands that workers are not to suffer adverse 
consequences for exercising their rights under the act and that measures have been 
adopted to avoid a repetition of this unlawful employer behaviour. In the context of 
investigations of critical injuries and fatalities, it is notable that Ontario prosecutes 
employers far more frequently for OHS offences than do other Canadian jurisdictions.  
This is an important component of a best practices enforcement system as numerous 
commentators have reiterated that big sticks are needed at the top of an enforcement 
pyramid of escalating sanctions to deal with serious and repeat offenders.218 In this 
context, further work needs to be done to inquire into why criminal prosecutions have 
been used so infrequently and with so little success when they have been tried, for 
these should be integrated into and sit at the top of the pyramid of potential sanctions 
both for their specific and general deterrent effects, and to emphasize the Rule of Law 
principle that mainstream criminal law applies to the wrongdoing in the workplace as 
much as it does to wrongdoing in other settings.219   
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There is also a question of the use of sanctions other than criminal or Part III 
provincial offence prosecutions for contraventions that result in critical injuries or 
fatalities.  As Gunningham and Johnstone  noted for Australia, and  is also true of 
Ontario, there is a split pyramid of sanctions, where lesser ones are used in the context 
of proactive inspections and stronger ones are used in the context of reactive 
inspections to critical injuries and fatalities.220  As already suggested, Part III POA 
prosecutions ought to be considered in appropriate cases for contraventions detected 
during a proactive inspection.  The question here is whether other enforcement actions, 
either in lieu of or in addition to prosecution should be considered for contraventions 
that resulted in a critical injury or death.     
Consistent with the position taken previously, that single incidents should trigger 
an examination of systemic problems, there is certainly a strong case to be made that 
follow up inspections should be conducted in the aftermath of a prosecution to ensure 
that specific deterrence has resulted in reform to the employer’s OHS management 
system such that the likelihood of future contraventions going undetected and 
uncorrected is substantially reduced.  Some Australian research has found that many 
employers respond to prosecutions in just this way,221 but follow-up inspections would 
increase the likelihood of improved OHS performance.  
With respect to the use of lesser sanctions in lieu of more serious ones, further 
research is required to know more precisely the criteria that are used to determine 
whether and when contraventions that result in critical injuries or deaths do not result in 
a prosecution.  Where they do not, the question arises as to whether there are lesser 
sanctions that would be appropriate. Some studies have reported that OHS compliance 
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improves after a sanction has been imposed, regardless of its size.222   This might 
suggest that a ticket would be effective in this context; however, there is a serious 
concern that a ticket would trivialize the seriousness of the consequences and send the 
wrong signal. A more promising alternative is the use of enforceable undertakings, a 
practice that has been used in Queensland, Australia.  Under this provision, a duty 
holder who has been charged with an OHS contravention can propose an enforceable 
undertaking, which will be accepted in lieu of the prosecution if it delivers benefits 
beyond compliance and tangible benefits to workers, the industry or the community.  
Undertakings will not be accepted where there has been a fatality or a serious breach of 
the Act. Enforceable undertakings include a description of the alleged offence, a 
statement of regret, an assurance about future behaviour, a requirement to provide 
third-party audit reports on compliance, and a commitment by the duty holder to pay the 
regulator’s investigation and monitoring costs.  More research is needed to assess the 
effectiveness of this enforcement tool and so it is too early to characterize it as a best 
practice; early accounts, however, are promising.223   
3. Voluntary Approaches 
 This discussion has already averted to the limits of voluntary compliance 
measures, noting that they cannot be a substitute for public enforcement. However, as 
in the case of ES, there are private enforcement measures that can play a role in 
improving OHS management and performance, provided they are well designed and 
linked to public enforcement mechanisms. 
 Thus far, this report has described OHS management systems on a number of 
occasions but has not defined them and so it will be useful to do so here.  According to 
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Kaj Frick and John Wren, OHS management systems embrace five core principles: 1) 
OHS conditions are an aspect of production, therefore; 2) top management is 
responsible for OHS conditions; 3) to abate work hazards management must integrate 
OHS considerations into all other management decisions; 4) systematic assessment 
and evaluation of work hazards is an essential prerequisite to making decisions about 
abatement and prevention; and 5) implementation of prevention and abatement requires 
tasks and resources to be adequately distributed within the organization.224 
 Voluntary OHS management systems (OHSM) have their roots in the Safety First 
movement that emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century and have been 
developed by management consultants and various firms and associations who have 
produced and marketed a variety of products such as the Five Star System, the 
International Safety Rating System and the DuPont System.  As well, many firms have 
developed their own internal OHSM systems.  These systems are typically highly 
specified and often require external private auditing for participating firms to become 
certified.  Because these systems are proprietary there is little independent research 
assessing their effectiveness.  Moreover, international private standard-setting 
organizations, such as the ISO, have not created an OHSM standard equivalent to the 
ISO 14000 standard regarding environmental management. 
 One common feature of many of these private systems is that they use a 
behaviour-based safety model which emphasizes the importance of motivating 
employees to follow the employers’ safety rules through a mixture of peer pressure (e.g. 
group incentives for consecutive no-lost time accident days), employer monitoring and 
discipline.  An earlier study of OHSM in Ontario expressed concern about the use of 
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such systems to marginalize worker participation and to promote the suppression of 
injury reporting and the shortening of recovery time.  Moreover, in the absence of 
independent assessment, it also rejected the view that firms that voluntarily adopt 
privately monitored OHSM systems should be exempt from routine government 
inspection.225  
 Walters et. al.’s recent study of OHSM internationally endorses the view that 
voluntary approaches are inadequate to the task and instead its authors advocate 
regulated OHSM, in which public inspection plays a critical role.226 This involves, on the 
one hand, public standards for OHSM systems and on the other government monitoring 
of compliance with those systems.  Internationally, a number of jurisdictions have 
established OHSM standards, including EU Framework Directive 89/391, which requires 
member states to implement principles of OHSM in their domestic OHS laws.  In 
Ontario, the OHSA provides a basic infrastructure for OHSM, including worker 
participation and monthly workplace inspections by worker HSRs and JHSC members.  
However, the authors of the study are also wary of making strong claims even for 
regulated OHSM systems.227   
In short, there is insubstantial evidence that the regulatory project pursued 
internationally to improve standards of OHSM has succeeded in significantly changing 
the ways in which most duty holders conceive or operationalise these arrangements in 
the workplaces for which they are responsible. Nor can it be said that its surveillance by 
regulatory inspection has effectively strengthened control over the improvement of the 
standards of OHSM.  It also therefore remains unproven that the operation of this form 
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of regulation has achieved the intended ‘acceptable level’ of protection for workers form 
the consequences of workplace risks. 
 Nevertheless, it has been almost two decades since Ontario last reformed the 
IRS provisions of the OHSA, and so it would be timely for a review to be undertaken to 
determine whether the legal infrastructure of OHSM complies with current best 
practices, especially in the context of the changing world of work and the challenges 
they pose for OHSM systems generally and for MOL monitoring of them.  As has been 
well documented,228  the growth of triangular employment relationships, supply chains 
and self-employment are often accompanied by problems of disorganization, including 
communication breakdowns, more complicated lines of management control and a 
decreased ability on the part of workers to recognize hazards and protect themselves 
from them.  Moreover, regulatory failure becomes more likely because laws and policies 
were often developed with the traditional employment relationship in mind and because 
monitoring production networks and chains puts a strain on available resources.  
 Finally, turning attention back to supply chain regulation, this time focusing on the 
role of voluntary codes, there has been a proliferation of voluntary codes relating to the 
responsibility of multinationals for the behaviour of their downstream contractors.  A 
wide range of provisions are made in these codes for monitoring, some of which are 
more independent than others.  For example, in Australia high profile transnational 
corporations involved in textile, clothing and footwear (TCF) production entered into an 
enforceable agreement with the union representing TCF workers under which all sites of 
production must be disclosed to the union, which is given the contractual authority to 
make unannounced inspections.229  As purely voluntary measures, supply chain 
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regulation has received mixed reviews.  Estlund, (who generally is favourably disposed 
toward the development of self-regulatory capacity, also recognizes that the programs 
she reviewed all had significant limitations.230  Supply chains must be headed by 
publicly visible companies with a significant stake in protecting their brand in order for 
them to be vulnerable to public pressure; activists must be able to sustain pressure 
indefinitely in order to ensure that voluntary agreements and monitoring arrangements 
do not lapse and degrade; resources must be available to support monitoring efforts, 
etc. So while some voluntary supply chain schemes are better than others, it would not 
be a best practice to give priority to the development of private regulation and private 
monitoring. The better approach to supply chain regulation requires that public 
regulatory authorities play a central role in establishing the obligations of the upstream 
duty holder, supervising the arrangements for monitoring the practices of contractors 
and sub-contractors and guaranteeing a role for worker voice in these arrangements.  A 
number of these efforts were described in the proactive section of OHS best practices 
and will not be repeated here.  
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VI. Policy Recommendations 
This report has mapped and drawn out an analysis of the limitations of current 
enforcement practices in ES and OHS.  It has observed that where unions are present 
in the OHS structures for workers’ voice, the self-regulatory model works better than 
when they are lacking. It has reviewed potential reform options based on best practices 
in Canadian and other jurisdictions. The report demonstrates that effective enforcement 
of labour standards to protect workers in precarious employment and regulate 
precarious labour markets will require multi-pronged proactive, reactive, and voluntary 
strategies. However, such strategies must be embedded in a strong public/government 
enforcement model. This model should be centered on proactive enforcement. Even 
though proactive approaches should be prioritized, as they offer the most promise of the 
three approaches in upholding the normative principles of providing for decent work, 
social minima, universality, and fairness, there is value in certain reactive and voluntary 
measures.  Reactive enforcement must ensure effective voice and support for workers 
to enforce their ES and protection from reprisals. Voluntary strategies that rely on non-
state parties (i.e., employers, employer associations, workers, union and workers 
organizations), must ensure meaningful penalties for employers in non-compliance, on 
the one hand, and meaningful institutionalized involvement of workers and their 
organizations in furthering enforcement effectiveness, on the other hand.  Under no 
circumstances are purely voluntary approaches recommended; they should only be 
used to augment otherwise strong and binding (ideally proactive) approaches.  
 A number of recommendations for changes in policy and practice flow from the 
survey of best practices contained in Section V, considered in light of the deficiencies 
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characterizing the current regimes of ES and OHS enforcement in Ontario documented 
in preceding sections.  The recommendations are divided into these categories of 
proactive, reactive, and voluntary approaches, noting the connections between these 
proposals and such principles where relevant. 
 
A.  ES Enforcement231 
1. Proactive Approaches 
(i) Investigations & Inspections 
1. Shift model of proactive enforcement to detecting violations and enforcement of 
ES for current employees in addition to the current focus of bringing employers 
into compliance. Routinely follow-up inspections with audits to ensure social 
minima are met through ongoing compliance.  
2. Pursue strategic enforcement: Develop enforcement priorities and proactively 
target employers in high-violation industries and substandard practices.  This 
involves mapping labour market practices (i.e., in the interest of the fairness 
principle, following up on previous cases of employer violations, new forms of 
work organization, sectors and industries comprised of concentrations of young 
workers, recent immigrants, women, racialized workers and other indicators of 
high rates of employer violations) to develop strategic plans for inspections and 
year by year targets. Develop benchmarking to evaluate strategic enforcement.  
3. Support expanded investigations: Where an individual claim has confirmed 
violations, this should be used to trigger a broader investigation of other 
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violations of the employer to protect current employees as is common in other 
jurisdictions. This recommendation too is consistent with the goal of fairness. 
4. Pursue multi-agency investigations of employers and targeted sectors or 
practices: Initiate multi-agency investigations, possibly beginning with the 
introduction of a pilot project in which OHS and ES inspectorates engage in joint 
initiatives.  Through such investigations, target practices such as 
misclassification of employees as ‘independent contractors’ and sub-contracting 
(in this process, a reverse onus in which a worker is presumed to be an 
employee unless the employer can provide proof to the contrary should be 
pursued). Such measures elevate the principles of both universality – that is, 
extending existing protections to the greatest number of workers – and fairness 
given the need to safeguard misclassified workers. 
5. Introduce state-supported up the chain inspections and investigations: The MOL 
should consider making agreements with large firms engaging subcontractors 
that make them responsible for their subcontractors at lower levels of the chain, 
through the introduction of a regime of inspection supervised by the Ministry or a 
joint taskforce involving workers and their advocates, and simultaneously 
strengthen provisions for joint and several liability in the ESA.232  Here again, 
fairness, universality and providing for social minima for all workers in the chain 
of production are key objects. 
6. Introduce a ‘positive duty’ for employers to prevent violations of the ESA.233  This 
recommendation is directed at achieving all four principles but elevates fairness 
in particular. 
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7. Enact a “hot cargo” provision to the ESA that would enable inspectors to impose 
an embargo on goods manufactured in violation of Act to ensure that, in fairness, 
penalties are felt by all parties to the chain of production.234 
(ii) Penalties & Settlements 
8. Create an effective presumption of employer retaliation: In the interest of 
fairness, universality and establishing social minima, prevent employer retaliation 
by protecting workers who assert their rights by establishing a set fine for 
confirmed reprisals and providing interim reinstatement during claims 
investigation for workers that have been fired for seeking entitlements (i.e., 
establish a fast-track process for reinstatement and, in cases where 
reinstatement is not feasible, fast-track compensation of workers who have been 
penalized for attempting to enforce their rights, including all lost wages and costs 
of employer retaliation).235 
9. Shift the costs of ES enforcement on those that violate the ESA: Consistent with 
the notion of fairness, make employers pay the administrative costs of inspecting 
violations and enforcing ES where they are found in violation of the ESA.236 
10. Establish set fines (rather than giving ESO discretion) for confirmed violations 
(even in settlement): The current use of Part I tickets ($360 or less) does not 
provide adequate incentives to comply with the law. Rather, in pursuit of just 
social minima and fairness, fines doubling or tripling the amount owed, such as 
provided for in the New York State Wage Theft Protection Act, would provide a 
better incentive. Further, workers should receive interest on all unpaid wages 
owing.237  
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11. Simplify and improve the transparency of prosecution policy: Each and every 
repeat violation or non-payment of orders should be prosecuted under Part III 
Provincial Offences so that employers are fined and ordered to pay unpaid 
wages in line with the notion of universality.   
(iii) Voice 
12. Encourage partnerships between the MOL and Community organizations to 
improve enforcement: The MOL should work with workers’ advocates and 
community organizations working directly with precariously employed workers to 
target companies and industries where wages go unpaid in order to promote both 
fairness and decent work.  These organizations are most grounded in the 
experience of the workers in concern and thus it is only just to involve them in the 
administrative process as elsewhere. 
13. Promote greater worker control over the labour standards through improved 
access to unionization and other workplace regulations fostering labour market 
security.  The decline in union density, particularly in the private sector, coupled 
with the growth of precarious employment creates substantial challenges to 
workers voice and enforcing a floor of minimum standards. There is a need to not 
only redress continued de-collectivization and/or stagnation of labour relations in 
Ontario but to reverse this trend. In addition, introduce mechanisms of broader-
based bargaining for self-employed and other workers in precarious paid 
employment who face challenges to unionizing and/or, at a minimum, to 
benefiting from collectively agreed social minima (see also Vosko and Noack, in 
this LCO working paper series).238   
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2. Reactive Approaches 
(i) Inspections & Investigations 
14. Allow for third-party and anonymous complaints to initiate inspections in order to 
minimize threats to workers whose rights are being violated. Implementing this 
recommendation would mean that the most precariously employed workers, 
facing heightened threats of reprisal, are not obliged to take on their employers in 
fairness to their situation and the goal of securing social minima. 
15. Streamline the complaints process and reduce the complaints backlog by 
providing, as a first step in the claims process, person-to-person assistance to 
workers to prepare their claim so that investigators can expeditiously adjudicate 
the matter. Administratively, this proposal, if implemented, would both deliver a 
fairer process for all workers to secure minimum protections, including those 
lacking access to the internet and/or the language proficiency to make claims 
and assist investigators in doing their jobs. 
(ii) Penalties & Settlements 
16. Update time limitations and monetary caps to reduce barriers to employment 
standards remedies: The increase in minimum wage and barriers to enforcing 
employment standards leaves many workers owed substantially more than the 
$10,000 cap on monies recoverable under the ESA. For this reason, in the 
interest of fairness and to ensure that social minima are up to date (i.e., reflect 
labour market realities), the Act’s limitation periods and amount of wages 
recoverable should be brought in line with Ontario’s small claims court. 
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Specifically, the monetary limit on monies that can be recovered should be 
changed to $25,000 and the ESA time limit should be extended to 2 years to 
recover wages and entitlements.239   
(iii) Voice 
17. Worker Representation in the claims-making process: To ensure that all workers 
have access to the claims process (i.e., universality) and in fairness, allow 
representation and provide funding for workers to have representation in 
reporting violations and the claims process as a whole. 
 
3. Voluntary Approaches 
18. Purely voluntary approaches to ES regulation and management are not 
recommended. 
(i) Investigations & Inspections 
19. Encourage the creation of a public procurement policy: The government of 
Ontario should require that its contractors adhere to not only minimum ES but 
industry norms so that the floor of social minima is elevated.  In its aim of 
improving social minima consistent with the costs of living in Ontario, this 
recommendation is consistent with the call for raising the wage levels, and 
augmenting the wage package, contained in another LCO report (Vosko and 
Noack, in this series), although it asks the government to take on a leadership 
role as a model employer.240 
20. Support partnerships between state agencies and worker organizations in 
improving enforcement: The review of best practices illustrates the merits of 
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creating initiatives aimed at enforcing labour standards where organizations of 
workers assist government agencies, including labour inspectorates, with 
spotting and documenting violations as well as assisting workers in making 
claims.  Such partnerships should be cultivated to ensure decent work for all. 
 
B.  OHS Enforcement  
1. Proactive Approaches 
1. Employ risk-based regulation: Use of risk-based regulation, which includes an 
assessment the OHS risks posed by an activity or by particular firms engaged in 
that activity based on their competence and commitment to control and manage 
those risks and is thus sensitive to ensuring that social minima and decent 
conditions of health and safety at work apply to all workers.  In pursuit of this 
approach to regulation, develop leading rather than lagging indicators for the 
purposes of making such assessments (as recommended by the Dean Report). 
(i) Investigations & Inspections 
2. Engage in safety blitzes: Safety blitzes based on appropriate risk assessments, 
which aim to ensure the principle of universality in that all workers are protected 
regardless of the industry in which they are located, should continue. 
3. Enforce OHS from the bottom-up: Use of a “bottom-up” approach in enforcement, 
which requires that when officials detect a violation - whether in the context of a 
proactive or a reactive inspection - they should not treat it as a discrete event; 
rather, in fairness to all workers with a given firm, the violation should trigger a 
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broader review of the employer’s OHS management system to determine why 
the violation occurred and was not detected and corrected by management. 
4. Prosecute before harm is done: To ensure social minima are in place, consider 
the use of Part III prosecutions as the result of proactive inspections that find 
significant departures from regulatory requirements notwithstanding that no harm 
has yet materialized. 
5. Avoid downward levelling through the use of tickets: Uphold decent conditions of 
work and social minima by using tickets appropriately; that is, tickets should be 
used, but not in a manner that allows responsibility for OHS to be pushed 
downwards.  A bottom-up approach (as above) requires that ticketed violations 
should be treated as a failure of the employer’s OHS management system that 
needs to be addressed at senior levels. 
6. Employ strategic enforcement practices in OHS enforcement: To ensure a fair 
and consistent approach to regulation, develop criteria for identifying sectors and 
firms in which employment fissuring has occurred so that they can be better 
targeted for proactive inspection. 
7. Sync budgets for inspections to the size of the labour force and the degree of 
fissuring in workplaces: In the interest of fairness, linking the budget for 
inspection both to the size of the labour force and to the degree of workplace 
fissuring is necessary because of the greater demand that it places on inspection 
resources. 
8. Develop supply chain regulation: To ensure universal treatment of all workers in 
a given chain of production, develop upstream approaches to supply chain 
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regulation that increase the responsibility at the top end of the chain for OHS 
performance at the lower levels.241 
9. Improve procurement policies: Government contracts, as model contracts, should 
require contractors to commit to specified OHS management practices, which 
include monitoring OHS performance by sub-contractors.  Government must 
monitor this dimension of contract compliance in the interest of supporting social 
minima. 
10. Enact a “hot cargo” provision to OHSA that would enable inspectors to impose an 
embargo on goods manufactured in violation of Act to ensure that social minima 
are respected and that all parties to production are penalized in a universal 
fashion.242 
11. Monitor OHS performance by sub-contractors: Impose an obligation on private 
sector employers to monitor OHS performance by sub-contractors and to 
exercise due diligence to ensure that contract terms do not create undue 
pressure on contractors to engage in unsafe practices.  Joint liability for 
downstream violations should be considered to ensure that all parties are treated 
fairly and subjected to the same requirements for providing for social minima for 
all workers in the chain of production.243 
(ii) Voice 
12. Create an institution of regional health and safety representatives: The decline in 
private sector union density creates a challenge for effective worker voice, a 
critical vehicle for securing fairness at work as well as social minima and decent 
terms and conditions, as does the growth of precarious employment.  The 
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creation of a functional equivalent to the Swedish institution of regional health 
and safety representatives should be considered, including the creation of the 
equivalent of an Office of the Worker Advisor or an expanded mandate for non-
governmental groups like the Workers’ Health and Safety Legal Clinic or the 
Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers.244 
2. Reactive Approaches 
(i) Investigations & Inspections 
13. Retaliatory behaviour should be penalized appropriately: In recognition of the 
unequal relationship between workers and employers, and in fairness to workers 
who pursue complaints about their employers despite this power imbalance, in 
the context of inspections triggered by a complaint that a worker has experienced 
retaliation for exercising her rights under the Act, inspectors should consider 
recommending Part III prosecutions for violations of the Act when appropriate 
(See Dean Report). 
14. Mandate follow-up inspections in cases of employer retaliation: Consistent with 
the bottom-up approach which aims to ensure that social minima extend to all 
workers, where there has been a finding that retaliation has occurred, this should 
trigger a follow-up inspection to determination whether the employer’s OHS 
management system has been reformed to insure that workers’ OHS rights are 
now better protected. 
15. Inquire into the limited use of criminal prosecutions: OHS regulation is about 
protecting workers from bodily harm.  In the interest of universality through safety 
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for all workers, investigate why criminal prosecutions have not been better 
integrated into the pyramid of enforcement. 
16. Mandate follow-up inspections in cases of prosecutions under the OHSA or the 
Criminal Code:  To promote decent work by ensuring that all workers are safe in 
the workplaces of known violators, follow-up inspections should occur after a 
successful prosecution under the Criminal Code or the OHSA to insure that the 
employer has responded by correcting the deficiencies in its OHS management 
system. 
17. Consider introducing enforceable undertakings: Investigate the use of 
enforceable undertakings where OHS contraventions occurred but for which a 
prosecution is not required so that the social minima for all workers in the 
workplaces in question are protected.245 
3. Voluntary Approaches 
18. Purely voluntary approaches to OHS regulation and management are not 
recommended. 
19. Review current regulation of OHS management systems in Ontario, taking into 
account the changing world of work and the challenges this poses to OHS 
management and to the regulation of OHS management in fairness to workers 
and to ensure that these systems keep a pace with workplace realities.  
20. Employ the selective and strategic use of voluntary codes of conduct to 
supplement, but not replace, public regulations: In the context of supply chains, 
voluntary codes of conduct may provide some amelioration under certain 
conditions, but the preferable and fairest approach is for public regulatory 
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authorities to play a central role in imposing obligations on upstream duty 
holders, including the arrangements for monitoring downstream compliance, and 
in guaranteeing a role for worker voice.  
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